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THE ADAM WALSH CHILD PROTECTION AND 
SAFETY ACT: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASPECTS OF THE NEW CIVIL COMMITMENT LAW 
FOR FEDERAL SEX OFFENDERS 
JOHN FABIAN* 
ABSTRACT 
The Adam Walsh Act (AWA) became law on July 27, 2006, and is the most 
expansive and punitive sex offender law ever initiated by the federal government.  
One aspect of the statute, and the topic of this article, is the civil commitment of 
federal sex offenders.  The AWA civil commitment law has its roots in prior U.S. 
Supreme Court cases including Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane. 1  While 
the federal commitment statute is similar to traditional state commitment laws, the 
AWA does not provide for a finding of “likely” to commit sex offenses.  Rather, the 
statute defines a “sexually dangerous person” as having “serious difficulty refraining 
from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.”  Assessing the 
likelihood of recidivism and volitional impairments leading to sexual recidivism in 
light of the AWA and state commitment statutes are critical determinations.  The 
accuracy, validity, and interrater reliability of the measurement of volitional 
impairment is considerably lacking among experts and within the empirical literature 
of sex offending in general.  Similarly, examining the legal terms “mental illness, 
abnormality, or disorder” under the AWA will entail a thoughtful application of 
clinical psychiatric diagnoses recognized in the mental health profession.  Many of 
these psychiatric diagnoses (primarily paraphilias) utilized in legal commitment 
proceedings are debated by adversarial expert witnesses in these hearings.  As the 
AWA pertains to federal sex offenders, the expert witness must consider their 
differences from state sex offenders, as many of the former group are more likely to 
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clinical psychologist and fellowship trained clinical neuropsychologist.  Dr. Fabian has a 
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have histories of online solicitation and child pornography possession in their 
criminal backgrounds.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Congress recently passed the most comprehensive sex 
offender law in U.S. history.  This statute, the Adam Walsh Act (AWA),2 is a 
comprehensive federally initiated sex offender law responding to political and public 
concern about keeping society safe from sex offenders.  The law represents high 
profile victims such as Adam Walsh, Megan Kanka, Dru Sjodin, and Jessica 
Lunsford and incorporates far reaching procedures that the government perceives 
will prevent other high profile sex offenses from occurring.   
While the AWA has many aspects including an emphasis on enhancing penalties 
for sex crimes, establishing new federal sex offenses, and creating a national sex 
offender registry database, this Article will focus on one element of the statute, 
namely the civil commitment of federal sex offenders. The author will briefly outline 
the U.S. Supreme Court landmark sex offender civil commitment cases, Kansas v. 
Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane,3 which lay the foundation for federal civil 
commitment.  In addition to discussing the legal principals of the AWA and 
comparing them to current state civil commitment statutes, the author will consider 
the AWA’s language with the science of sexual violence risk assessment.  Particular 
attention will be paid to the assessment of volitional impairment in sex offenders as 
the AWA does not specifically delineate a finding of “likely” to commit sex 
offenses.  Instead, the statute defines a “sexually dangerous person” as “a person 
who has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child 
molestation and who is sexually dangerous to others.”4  Being “sexually dangerous 
to others” means having “serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct 
or child molestation if released.”5  A finding of likelihood of sexual recidivism is a 
constitutional mandate outlined in Hendricks, and the field of forensic psychology 
and psychiatry is making gains in risk assessment examining likelihood of sexual 
recidivism.  However, the field of risk assessment is lacking consistent empirical 
support defining volitional impairments relevant to a threshold for legal civil 
commitment.  The author will comment on diagnostic dilemmas that experts face in 
sexual offender civil commitment proceedings.  The differentiation of federal sex 
offenders from state sex offenders will be explored as federal offenders are more 
likely to have a history of non-contact sex offenses and convictions for online 
solicitation and child pornography possession.  
II. ADAM WALSH ACT CIVIL COMMITMENT LAW 
In addition to focusing on creating harsher sentencing and penalties for federal 
sex crimes, the AWA’s legislative intent was to protect society from high risk and 
dangerous federal sex offenders.  Pursuant to this aim, and the crux of this Article, 
the AWA incorporates the first federal law for the civil commitment of sex offenders 
in the U.S. through its traditional civil commitment statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4248.  The 
statute has legislative objectives including allotting funding to states that are 
                                                           
 2 Adam Walsh Act (AWA), 42 U.S.C. § 16911 et seq. (2006). 
 3 Fabian, supra note 1, at 1374-78; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Kansas v. 
Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). 
 4 18 U.S.C. § 4142(a)(5) (2006). 
 5 18 U.S.C. § 4142(a)(6) (2006).   
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considering or already entertaining civil commitment laws and to mandating the civil 
commitment of sexually dangerous federal offenders.6 
Considering the former objective, about twenty states currently have 
implemented civil commitment statutes confining sexually violent predators and 
many states that have not elected to do so often reject bills due to various reasons.  
The cost of implementing such treatment programs and funding for legal 
representation and expert witnesses to evaluate the offenders has led many states to 
consider harsher sentencing laws for sex offenders on the front end rather than 
commitment laws for those about to be released. The AWA considers these state 
level concerns and provides federal funding for states who wish to implement 
commitment statutes.   
Important to the primary objective of the AWA civil commitment law appears to 
be protection of society and treatment/rehabilitation.  The AWA authorizes the 
Attorney General or any individual authorized by the Attorney General or the 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons to attempt to certify any sex offender who is in the 
custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), who has been committed to the 
custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), or against whom 
all criminal charges have been dismissed solely due to the mental condition of the 
offender as a sexually dangerous person.  
In order to initiate commitment proceedings, the BOP must provide evidence 
based on a clear and convincing standard that a particular offender is a sexually 
dangerous person.7  A “sexually dangerous person” means that the defendant “has 
engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and 
who is sexually dangerous to others.”8  The definition of sexually dangerous to 
others “means that the person suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or 
disorder as a result of which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from 
sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.”9   
The statute does not define the terms “sexually violent conduct” or “child 
molestation,” and the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, is presently 
attempting to interpret them in part through federal criminal statutes. 10   Further, the 
                                                           
 6 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.910 (West 1998).  
 7 See Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous Person, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,205, 43,205 
(Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 549, subpart H).  
 8 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5) (2006). 
 9 18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 549.94 (2008). 
 10 Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous Person, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,206.  See 
Memorandum for All Regional Directors and Wardens (Sept. 28, 2007) (on file with U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice Fed. Bureau of Prisons).  The BOP has considered interim procedures for 
implementation of AWA civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons, definitions of 
sexually violent conduct including the use or threatened use of force against the victim; 
threatening or placing the victim in fear that the victim or any other person will be harmed; 
rendering the victim unconscious and engaging in conduct of a sexual nature with the victim; 
administering to the victim by force or threat of force or without knowledge, substances 
impairing the victim’s ability to appraise control or thought; engaging in such conduct with a 
victim who is incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct, or physically or mentally 
incapable of declining participation in or communicating unwillingness to engage in that 
conduct; engaging in any conduct of a sexual nature with another person with knowledge of 
having tested positive for HIV or other potentially life-threatening sexually-transmissible 
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AWA does not define the terms “serious mental illness,” “abnormality,” or 
“disorder.”  
The BOP’s first step of determining evidence of sexually violent conduct or child 
molestation includes gathering information from the Pre-Sentence Investigative 
Report, Statement of Reasons, Criminal Judgment, and other resources indicated in 
28 C.F.R. § 549.90(c).11  Further records the BOP may consider include, but are not 
limited to, information from civil and criminal proceedings, information obtained by 
U.S. Attorney offices, federal and non-federal authorities, statements and admissions 
by the offender, and medical records.  The determination of whether the offender is a 
sexually dangerous person includes a forensic examination by a psychologist or 
psychiatrist pursuant to the statute’s psycho-legal criteria.   
The BOP Certification Review Panel Guidelines include: (1) a behavioral 
element (engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child 
molestation); (2)  a diagnostic element, including possible diagnoses not limited to 
pedophilia, sexual sadism, paraphilia not otherwise specified (NOS) non-consent, 
hebephilia, etc.; sexual disorder; antisocial personality disorder; and personality 
disorder NOS; and (3) a risk element that the inmate will have serious difficulty 
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation.12  The risk element 
includes a review of risk factors related to sex offending and can include 
documented  patterns of behavior, statements made during treatment and actuarial 
assessment data used to determine sexual recidivism.  Further, the Guidelines 
support the clinical adjustment of actuarial instruments that add incrementally to the 
predictive accuracy of the actuarial method with various aggravating and mitigating 
factors.13 
Federal offenders who are found incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or other offenders who have at some time demonstrated sexually 
violent conduct or child molestation through past charges or dismissed charges (does 
                                                           
disease without the informed consent of the other person.  The BOP considers a definition of 
child molestation, including any unlawful conduct of a sexual nature with a person under 
eighteen years of age. 
 11 Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous Person, 28 C.F.R. § 549.90(c) (2008). 
 12 Memorandum, Bureau of Prisons, supra note 10.   
 13 See generally id. (stating that the Guidelines support clinical adjustments to actuarial 
risk assessment data with the following information: evidence of significant victim injury, 
torture, or death; forcible confinement of victims; evidence of sadistic behavior including 
paraphernalia such as rape kits and torture devises or other methods indicating sadistic 
behavior; evidence of statements of future intent or plans to commit sexual offenses or 
exploitation; behavioral evidence of paraphilic sexual activity, compulsion, or gross sexual 
dysregulation; evidence of psychopathy and PCL-R score of twenty-seven or greater; evidence 
of deviant sexual arousal as measured by penile plythesmography; sex offender treatment 
failure; and history of violation of supervised release).  Mitigating factors to be considered 
include completion of a sex offender treatment program demonstrating knowledge of sex 
offender treatment skills; advanced age—sixty years of age or older and when remaining 
community supervision covers a substantial portion of person’s remaining life; chronic and 
severe medical condition diminishing risk of sex offending, i.e., impotence and sexual 
dysfunction; absence of a pattern of sex offending; cases in which the offender’s sex offense 
history is in the remote past and when there is no history of offending during the last 15 years, 
especially when the offender was living  in the community for long periods without sex 
offending.  
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not mandate that sex offender conduct be based on a current conviction), can be 
considered for commitment.  In essence, the current crime for which the offender is 
serving a period of incarceration does not need to be a sexually related offense.  
Rather, the offender can have a prior sex offense in his record and a current 
nonsexual offense, or he can have demonstrated sexually inappropriate behavior 
while in prison, and these acts can be the justification for the implementation of 
commitment proceedings. 
Accordingly, when considering the definition of a sexually dangerous person, “it 
is not necessary that a person have been charged with or convicted of any criminal 
act related to the conduct being considered—a limitation that could prevent a mental 
health professional from considering probative and relevant evidence such as long-
established patterns of behavior, admissions of criminal activity previously 
undetected by authorities, and statements of intent to commit future sexually violent 
crimes or acts of child molestation.”14  In essence, under the AWA, the BOP grants 
the forensic examiner wide latitude in the amount of collateral information he can 
consider when assessing for difficulty in refraining from violent sex offending even 
if this information is not based on formal charges/convictions.  
After the government has initiated a certification for commitment of a federal 
offender under the AWA, the commitment process becomes adversarial in nature.  
The court may request a psychiatric and/or psychological examination of the 
defendant to be conducted and the subsequent report(s) be filed with the court.15  The 
adversary hearing process includes a determination by the court and not through a 
civil jury trial, by clear and convincing evidence burdened by the government, as to 
whether the offender meets the sexually dangerous person criteria.16  If the civil 
respondent (formerly criminal defendant) is found to meet criteria, then he will be 
committed to the custody of the Attorney General and placed within a sex offender 
management or treatment type facility.  
When considering detention and treatment of federal sex offenders, the BOP 
provides for sex offender management programming that monitors offenders but 
does not formally provide treatment.  The AWA mandates the BOP to provide 
appropriate treatment to sex offenders who are in need of rehabilitation and who are 
appropriate for such treatment.17  One of the main treatment programs will be located 
at Federal Medical Center Fort Devins, Massachusetts.  Many of the sex offenders 
who will be petitioned for potential civil commitment may not have been offered sex 
offender treatment programming during their incarceration and will only be able to 
participate after they are found to be commitment eligible. 
Before the offender is discharged from commitment, the court will order a 
hearing to determine whether the offender should be released based primarily on 
treatment success and risk assessment.18  The legal threshold for release into the 
                                                           
 14 Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous Person, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,207. 
 15 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 4247(b) (West 2006).  After filing the certificate, the inmate’s release 
depends on a decision of the merits and the offender will continue to be detained even beyond 
his release date.  
 16 18 U.S.C.A. § 4248(d) (West 2006).   
 17 18 U.S.C.A. § 3621(f)(1) (West 2008). 
 18 18 U.S.C.A. § 4247(h) (West 2006).  
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community includes a preponderance proof standard that the offender is no longer 
sexually dangerous to others or will not be sexually dangerous to others if released 
under a prescribed regiment of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or 
treatment.   
The AWA statutory guidelines leave many unanswered questions.  The law does 
not establish a standard or burden of proof for risk to reoffend and does not permit a 
jury trial.  The law does not conclude whether the respondent has a right to remain 
silent and does not mandate him to participate in a court ordered examination.  The 
AWA does not  resolve discovery procedures, does not distinguish whether attorneys 
should incorporate the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, does not provide for a 
probable cause determination for proceedings, nor does it provide for periodic 
annual reviews and examinations.  The AWA does not describe procedures before 
the offender is released.  It allows for the indefinite commitment pursuant to the 
traditional commitment law under 42 U.S.C. § 4248, and it does not delineate least 
restrictive treatment/placement alternatives. 
Before analyzing the statutory language of the AWA civil commitment scheme, 
the author will discuss critical legal foundations stemming from two landmark cases 
that grant constitutional support to federal civil commitment, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court holdings in Kansas v. Hendricks19 and Kansas v. Crane.20   
A.  Kansas v. Hendricks and Crane 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a history of U.S. sex offender 
civil commitment laws.  However, readers must be reminded of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s monumental holdings in Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane.  In 
Hendricks,   Leroy Hendricks had a remarkable history of child molesting type 
offenses towards boys and girls and was diagnosed with paraphilic disorders 
including pedophilia and exhibitionism.  He admitted to being unable to control his 
urge to molest children and refused to participate in sex offender treatment.  In 
Hendricks,21 the Court upheld a Kansas law providing for the civil commitment of 
sex offenders who engaged in harmful predator sexual offending in the past, 
currently suffer from a mental abnormality including a mental illness and/or 
personality disorder, and because of this mental abnormality or personality disorder, 
posed as being likely to engage in future predatory acts of harmful sexual 
reoffending.22 
The Court articulated that the indefinite commitment condition was not punitive; 
rather, its objective was treatment of the offenders’ mental abnormality and 
personality disorders to diminish their likelihood of future dangerousness.23  Further, 
the Court supported the legal definitions of “mental abnormality” and “personality 
disorder” as satisfying “substantive” due process requirements.  This finding 
                                                           
 19 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).  
 20 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).   
 21 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355.  
 22 See id. at 371.  See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (West 1996).  
 23 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363.  
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ultimately thinned offenders eligible for confinement to those who are unable to 
control their dangerousness.24   
In Kansas v. Crane, the Court again heard similar issues, but was asked to take 
another look at Kansas’s commitment act by focusing on mental abnormality and 
volitional requirements leading to sex offending behaviors.  The Court 
acknowledged that in Hendricks it was not asked to set a formal volitional 
requirement associated with the amount of control a person might lack over his sex 
offending behaviors in order to qualify for commitment.  The Court in Crane 
considered that the “nature” and “severity” of the mental disorder “must be sufficient 
to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, 
abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but 
typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”25   
Michael Crane, unlike Leroy Hendricks, suffered primarily from an antisocial 
personality disorder (APD) as well as exhibitionism, rather than a primary paraphilic 
disorder as did Hendricks.  Crane argued that if the state was to commit a personality 
disordered individual, this individual must have a volitional impairment and be 
unable to control his sexually violent offending patterns.26  The Court in Crane held 
that in order to civilly commit a sex offender, the person’s mental abnormality or 
personality disorder must cause the individual to have “serious difficulty in 
controlling behavior,”27 rather than “total or complete lack of control.”28  This 
distinction is a key issue to the evaluation of sexual dangerousness.  The Court 
attempted to differentiate the typical sexual recidivist to the volitionally impaired 
recidivist.  The latter qualifying for commitment. 
While it is true that the holding in Crane concerned the definition of “mental 
abnormality” as causing serious difficulty in controlling behavior, the future 
dangerousness factor outlined in Hendricks continues to be the constitutional 
prerequisite even after Crane.  The issue of volition and assessment of sexual 
violence is pertinent to the topic of this paper as the AWA requires an assessment of 
an offender’s lack of control.   Before the Article examines this issue, the author 
presents a list of several current state sex offender civil commitment laws as they 
compare to the AWA requirements.  
B. How Do States Handle Civil Commitment? 
Nearly twenty states have implemented sexually violent predator (SVP) civil 
commitment statutes.  Table 1 includes a sampling of four state SVP statutes and the 
AWA civil commitment scheme characterized by the name of the statutes, their 
                                                           
 24 Id. at 358. 
 25 Crane, 534 U.S. at 413; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(b) (West 2000) (stating 
the definition of “mental abnormality” includes a congenital or acquired condition affecting 
the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent 
offenses in a degree constituting such person to menacing the health and safety of others).  
 26 In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 287 (Kan. 2000).  
 27 Crane, 534 U.S. at 407.  
 28 Id. at 411.   
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss2/3
2012] THE ADAM WALSH CHILD PROTECTION AND SAFETY ACT 315 
definitions of a sexually violent predator, definitions of the criteria for mental 
abnormality, and legal thresholds for commitment. Table 1: 
Jurisdiction      SVP Statute   Mental abnormality 
Florida 
394.91229 
A sexually violent predator is any 
person who: (a) has been convicted of 
a sexually violent offense; and (b) 
suffers from a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder that makes the 
person likely to engage in acts of 
sexual violence if not confined in a 
secure facility for long-term control, 
care, and treatment. 
A mental condition 
affecting the person’s 
emotional or volitional 
capacity which 
predisposes the person to 
commit sexually violent 
offenses. 
 
Washington 
71.09.02030 
Any person who has been 
convicted of or charged with a crime 
of sexual violence and who suffers 
from a mental abnormality or 
personality disorder which makes the 
person likely to engage in predatory 
acts of sexual violence if not confined 
to a secure facility. 
 
A congenital or 
acquired condition 
affecting the emotional or 
volitional capacity which 
predisposes the person to 
the commission of 
criminal sexual acts in a 
degree constituting such 
person a menace to the 
health and safety of 
others. 
Arizona 
36-370131 
A sexually violent person: (a) has 
ever been convicted of or found guilty 
but insane of a sexually violent 
offense or was charged with a 
sexually violent offense and was 
determined incompetent to stand trial; 
and (b) has a mental disorder that 
makes the person likely to engage in 
acts of sexual violence. 
 
Mental disorder . . . a 
paraphilia, personality 
disorder, or conduct 
disorder or any 
combination of paraphilia, 
personality disorder, or 
conduct disorder that 
predisposes a person to 
commit sexual acts to 
such a degree as to render 
the person a danger to the 
health and safety of 
others.  
New York 
10.0332 
A person who is a detained sex 
offender suffering from a mental 
abnormality involving such a strong 
predisposition to commit sex 
offenses, and such an inability to 
control behavior, that the person is 
likely to be a danger to others and to 
Means a congenital or 
acquired condition, 
disease, or disorder that 
affects the emotional, 
cognitive, or volitional 
capacity of a person in a 
manner that predisposes 
                                                           
 29 FLA. STAT. § 394.192(10), (5) (2008). 
 30 WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(18), (8) (2009). 
 31 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701 (2010).  
 32 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(e), (i) (McKinney 2011).  
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commit sex offenses if not confined 
to a secure treatment facility.  
 
him or her to the 
commission of conduct 
constituting a sex offense 
and that results in that 
person having serious 
difficulty in controlling 
such conduct.  
AWA “Sexually dangerous person” 
means that the defendant has engaged 
or attempted to engage in sexually 
violent conduct or child molestation 
and who is sexually dangerous to 
others.  
 
Serious mental illness, 
abnormality, or disorder 
as a result of which he 
would have serious 
difficulty refraining from 
sexually violent conduct 
or child molestation if 
released. 
 
When reviewing the civil commitment standards of select states, their criteria are 
similar.  However, the State of New York and the AWA, being the two most recent 
civil commitment laws in the U.S. at the time of this Article’s preparation, both 
adhere to the Crane holding requiring a finding of volitional impairment—”serious 
difficulty refraining from” found in the AWA and “inability to control behavior” and 
“serious difficulty controlling” as listed in the New York statute.  The other state 
statutes primarily require a commitment threshold as being “likely” to commit future 
sexual offenses.    
C.  A Comment on Defining Psychiatric Terms Within Legal Language 
In the wake of Hendricks and Crane, courts, experts, and attorneys are burdened 
with attempting to define various ambiguous terms relevant to the commitment of a 
sex offender such as “likely” and “mental abnormality.”  Importantly, forensic 
examiners and lawyers handling these civil commitment cases have joined in 
consensus that formal psychiatric diagnoses outlined in the DSM-IV-TR are required 
to substantiate legal mental abnormality.  The common statutory language in SVP 
statutes, “congenital/acquired condition” affecting “emotional/volitional capacity” 
alludes to a psychiatric diagnosis listed in the DSM-IV-TR.  In California, the SVP 
statute refers to “diagnosed mental disorder,”33 Minnesota34 and North Dakota35 refer 
to “sexual disorder,” Arizona refers to “paraphilia,”36 while Nebraska refers to 
“mental illness.”37  This agreement amongst legal and mental health professionals 
causes strenuous debate about the fortitude of these diagnoses.  
Critical to this discussion, the term “mental abnormality” is a legal term rather 
than a psychiatric idiom which usurps psychiatric terminology to achieve a social 
                                                           
 33 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6609 (Deering 2011). 
 34 MINN. STAT. § 253B.02(18c) (2011). 
 35 N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8) (2011). 
 36 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3701(5) (LexisNexis 2011).  
 37 See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1204 (LexisNexis 2011).  
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and political result.38  To simplify matters, the Court ruled in Crane that any 
psychiatric diagnosis and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be 
sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness, 
abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but 
typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.39  These diagnoses in SVP 
cases are centered around paraphilias such as pedophilia and exhibitionism as well as 
personality disorders, namely antisocial personality disorder and the construct of 
psychopathy.   
Despite disagreement—by some experts and definitely by lawyers representing 
sex offenders—that there is little interrater reliability among experts relevant to how 
accurately and consistently examiners diagnose40 and come to similar conclusions, 
courts will continue to rely heavily on experts’ diagnostic opinions in defining legal 
mental abnormalities and disorders.  Scholars have debated that diagnoses are not 
particularly relevant to defining legal mental abnormality.41  Others have specifically 
addressed the connection between the individual’s psychological impairment and the 
legal criteria for eligibility of commitment rather than between the impairment and 
the criteria for clinical diagnostic categories.42   
                                                           
 38 Position Statement on Sexually Violent Predators Civil Commitment Legislation, N.Y.S. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Mar. 13, 2006), http://www.nyspsych.org/public/components/society 
tools/admin/viewNewnews.asp?newsjob=ArticleID&ArticleID=6922&ArticleName=Position
+Statement+on+Sexually+Violent+Predators+Civil+Confinement+Legislation. 
 39 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). See generally Wisconsin v. Post, 541 
N.W.2d 115 (Wis. 1995) (holding that every condition is congenital or acquired and emotional 
and volitional capacity describes decision making processes affecting how people act; 
therefore, mental disorder under the statute means no more than a person’s predisposition to 
engage in sexually violent conduct).  One can assume that a person’s mental disorder is 
derived from their past sex offenses.  
 40 Lea H. Studer & A. Scott Aylwin, Pedophilia: The Problem with Diagnosis and 
Limitations of CBT Treatment, 67 MED. HYPOTHESES 774, 777 (2006).; see, e.g., Terence W. 
Campbell, Challenging the Evidentiary Reliability of DSM-IV, 17 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 
47, 47-68 (1999); Stuart A. Kirk & Herb Hutchins, The Myth of the Reliability of DSM, 15 J. 
MIND & BEHAV. 71, 71-86 (1994); Jill S. Levenson, Reliability of Sexually Violent Predator 
Civil Commitment Criteria in Florida, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 357, 362 (2004); William L. 
Marshall & Steven J. Hucker, Issues in the Diagnosis of Sexual Sadism, 1 SEX OFFENDER 
TREATMENT 4, 6 (2006); William O’Donohue, Lisa G. Regev & Anne Hagstrom, Problems 
with the DSM-IV Diagnosis of Pedophilia, 12 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 95, 95-
105 (2000); Richard Wollert, Poor Diagnostic Reliability, the Null-Bayes Logic Model, and 
Their Implications for Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations, 13 J. PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
167, 174 (2007).    
 41 See Stephen Morse, Law and Mental Health Professionals: The Limits of Expertise, 9 
PROF. PSYCHOL. 289, 396 (1978); Stephen Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An 
Analysis of Mental Health Law, S. CAL. L. REV. 526, 530 (1978) (espousing that the field of 
psychology and psychiatry has not demonstrated special knowledge concerning the relation 
between the observed symptoms and the specific behaviors that are related to the law’s 
questions and concerns).  Experts’ opinions about specific functional abilities and behaviors 
are not based on any specialized knowledge about the relations of the symptoms or diagnoses 
to the functional abilities in question.   
 42 See Robert F. Schopp & Barbara J. Sturgis, Sexual Predators and Legal Mental Illness 
for Civil Commitment, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 466, 466  (1995) (stating that psychiatric diagnoses 
describe behavioral symptoms of disorders, and many of these symptoms are present within 
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In the face of strenuous debate on this issue, courts will likely accept any 
psychiatric diagnosis that is recognized in the “medical or psychiatric literature”43 
despite their vagueness.  Diagnoses addressing sexual deviance and antisocial 
behavior are included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental 
Disorders44 and provide descriptive lists of behavioral requirements for each 
diagnosis.  If experts refused to utilize the DSM-IV-TR for example, they would 
have to rely on the offender’s past behaviors relevant to commitment, i.e., offenses, 
which in part define the clinical diagnoses.  Importantly, the DSM-IV-TR provides 
behavioral symptomatology for a diagnosis but does not define the intensity required 
for such a diagnosis.  
In addition to the acceptance of antisocial personality disorder as a diagnosis 
associated with the commitment of sex offenders, courts will also accept the 
construct of psychopathy reformulated and enhanced by psychologist, Dr. Robert 
Hare,45 as it also appears in the psychological literature pertaining to its etiological 
link to criminality and sex offending.46 
When commenting on the ambiguity of the term “mental abnormality,” courts 
similarly have not clinically defined other psycholegal terms such as 
“incompetency” or “insanity.”47  In fact, the Court commented in its Hendricks 
ruling that “mental illness” is devoid of any talismanic significance as “psychiatrists 
disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness.”48  The Court 
opined, “[I]f it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to 
                                                           
the offenders’ criminal and sex offending behaviors).  Therefore, diagnoses are an imperative 
component to civil commitment determinations.  
 43 Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-22, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (Nos. 
95-1649, 95-9075).   
 44 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 701 (4th ed. 2000).   
 45 Robert Hare, Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 
AND LAW (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2008).   
 46 See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 997 (Wash. 1993); Jeffery Abracen, Jan Looman & 
Calvin M. Langton, Treatment of Sexual Offenders with Psychopathic Traits: Recent Research 
Developments and Clinical Implications, 9 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 144, 144-66 (2008); 
Calvin M. Langton et al., Sex Offenders’ Response to Treatment and its Association with 
Recidivism as a Function of Psychopathy, 18 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 99, 106; 
Jan Looman et al., Psychopathy, Treatment Change, and Recidivism in High-Risk, High-Need 
Sexual Offenders, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 549, 554 (2005); Mark E. Olver & Stephen 
C. P. Wong, Psychopathy, Sexual Deviance, and Recidivism Among Sex Offenders, 18 
SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 65, 69 (2006); Ralph C. Serin, Donna L. Mailloux & P. 
Bruce Malcolm, Psychopathy, Deviant Sexual Arousal, and Recidivism Among Sexual 
Offenders, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 234, 235 (2001); Michael C. Seto & Howard E. 
Barbaree, Psychopathy, Treatment Behavior, and Sex Offender Recidivism, 14 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE  1235, 1236 (1999).   
 47 George Smith Hamilton, The Blurry Line Between “Mad” and “Bad”: Is “Lack-Of-
Control” a Workable Standard for Sexually Violent Predators?, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 481, 482 
(2002). 
 48 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1997) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 
68, 81 (1985)). 
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offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified, our precedents 
would not suffice to validate it.”49    
The Washington State Supreme Court provided a helpful legal opinion on this 
topic of defining psychiatric terms within the legal arena in In re Young.50  The court 
held that “[o]ver the years, the law has developed many specialized terms to describe 
mental health concepts.  For example, the legal definitions of ‘insanity’ and 
‘commitment’ vary substantially from their psychological and psychiatric 
counterparts.”51  “In using the concept of ‘mental abnormality’ the legislature has 
invoked a more generalized terminology that can cover a much larger variety of 
disorders . . . What is critical for our purposes is that psychiatric and psychological 
clinicians who testify in good faith as to mental abnormality are able to identify 
sexual pathologies that are as real and meaningful as other pathologies already listed 
in the DSM.”52   
The key issue is that expert witnesses on both sides testify in good faith and this 
is always subject to question given the adversarial nature of our court system. 
When we contemplate the evaluation of AWA cases we must focus on the 
language of the statute.  The language follows the holding of Crane and mandates an 
evaluation of volitional impairment in addition to the prerequisite finding of 
likelihood of reoffending pertinent to the holding in Hendricks.  The AWA requires 
a mental illness, abnormality, or disorder which results in the person having serious 
difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation.  When 
considering the legal language, similar to other state statutes, the offenders 
qualifying for federal commitment will likely qualify for pedophilia due to the 
numbers of federal offenders with child pornography and child sex crimes.  
Secondary diagnoses of exhibitionism, paraphilia not otherwise specified (NOS), 
non-consent (rape) subtype and hebephilia subtype, antisocial personality disorder, 
and a finding of psychopathy will also be considered as commitment 
diagnoses/constructs.53 
D.  Defining Volitional Impairments and Distinguishing “Serious Difficulty 
Refraining” from “Likely” 
Many of the state civil commitment statutes include a “likely” to reoffend 
component.  The expert witness’s business of risk assessment in state cases is 
                                                           
 49 Id. at 373.  
 50 In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1001 (Wash. 1993) (quoting Alexander D. Brooks, The 
Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 709, 733 (1992)). 
 51 Id. at fn. 5. 
 52 Id. at 1001.  
 53 See Jack Vognsen & Amy Phenix, Antisocial Personality Disorder Is Not Enough: A 
Reply to Sreenivasan, Weinberger, and Garrick, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 440, 441 
(2004) (discussing that, despite the holding in Crane supporting a commitment of offenders 
whose serious difficulty refraining is caused by antisocial personality disorder, many experts 
do not believe and will not opine or testify to the recommendation of commitment for an 
offender based only on an antisocial personality disorder diagnosis).  Similarly, other experts 
will not agree that a paraphilia disorder nonconsent rape type exists within the psychiatric 
nomenclature. 
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typically founded in legal statute by determining the likelihood of future acts.  As 
mentioned, despite the holding in Hendricks outlining a constitutional “likelihood” 
requirement, the AWA does not mention the term likely; rather, it incorporates 
Crane terminology of volitional impairment.  As reviewed in Crane, the Court ruled 
that a potential sex offender being considered for commitment need only be found to 
have a mental abnormality or disorder that makes it “difficult, if not impossible, for 
the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior.”54  The Court held that the 
SVP standard required a substantial loss of volitional impairment, rather than a total 
loss of control because the latter could not be demonstrated with mathematical 
precision.55  Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court estimated that the existence of a 
mental abnormality or personality disorder that causes a likelihood of sexual 
recidivism thereby establishes the requisite difficulty if not impossibility of control 
over one’s behavior.56 
The question of whether one’s likelihood of future sexual recidivism and one’s 
volitional impairment are the same is a fascinating inquiry.  Interestingly, in many 
state civil commitment hearings in which the state has a likelihood threshold of 
future dangerousness, trial court judges do not allow the experts to testify to Crane 
volitional impairment opinions.57  In essence, the judges are adhering to the 
“likelihood” language of their particular statute developed by the respective 
legislature, rather than allowing the jury to consider the specific volitional language 
in Crane.58 
The holding in Crane leaves federal courts hearing AWA commitment cases with 
many unanswered questions.  How does a federal court define “serious difficulty 
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released?”59  Should 
the court presume that likely and serious difficulty refraining are the same?  If so, 
how does a federal court define likely?  It may be argued that likely means more than 
likely (greater than 51%).  It may also be debated that having serious difficulty 
                                                           
 54 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 583 (2000). 
 55 Id. at 413. 
 56 Id. at 407. 
 57 This comment is based on this author’s evaluation and testimony experience in sexually 
violent predator civil commitment proceedings.  
 58 See Florida v. White, 891 So. 2d 502, 507 (Fla. 2004) (holding that the defendant 
requested the court instruct the jury that to be civilly committed, the defendant had to be 
unable to control his dangerous behavior).  The Supreme Court of Florida cited the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Crane which does not require a specific volitional impairment 
jury instruction, but rather proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior in order to be 
civilly committed. See also In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2003); In re 
Civil Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).  A few states 
have found that Crane imposes an affirmative additional duty to determine lack of control and 
two states found that the jury must be instructed that the respondent must have serious 
difficulty controlling behavior.  
 59 See Crane, 534 U.S. at 423 (Scalia, A., dissenting) (questioning how the majority 
opinion defines an offender’s inability to control sex offending behaviors when considering 
features of the case and the nature of psychiatric diagnosis and the severity of the mental 
abnormality: The law “gives trial courts not a clue in how they are supposed to charge a 
jury!”).  
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refraining means the offender is more than likely to sexually reoffend.  If a court 
applying Crane questions the mathematical precision in assessing inability to 
control, should expert witnesses incorporate mathematically based actuarial risk 
assessment instruments in their sex offender assessments when attempting to address 
volitional impairments in AWA commitment hearings?  Simply, the Court’s 
assumption that the qualitative and quantitative assessment of substantial loss of 
control has more mathematical precision is seriously questioned by mental health 
professionals.   
When addressing this latter question, the AWA statute does not require the use of 
these instruments to assess risk of future sex offenses, but the BOP encourages their 
use.60  Experts may utilize these instruments to assess the volitional threshold of 
commitment and will also attempt to obtain other information including the 
offenders’ offense record and self-report of other crimes, number of victims, 
fantasies, behaviors etc., that are related to assessing paraphilia diagnoses associated 
with volitional impairment.  
The AWA’s legislative intent recognizes the U.S. Supreme Court volitional 
language found in Crane.  The intent may include avoiding the use of terms such as 
“likely” and “substantial probability” because they do not lend themselves to 
percentages or numerical exactness very easily in its statutory definition.  However, 
the federal courts hearing AWA cases may still consider qualifying the ambiguous 
language of “serious difficulty refraining from future sexual violence and child 
molestation” through assessments of likelihood of future risk of sex offending since 
the likelihood language is recognized in Hendricks.    
Some state courts have not translated “likely” into a statistical probability.61  
Other courts have understood likely to mean “highly probable”62 or “substantial 
danger that is, a serious and well founded risk,”63 and even have distinguished 
between likelihood of recurrence of sexual misconduct, the likely frequency of any 
such behavior, and the magnitude of harm to other persons that is likely to result.  
When assessing volitional impairments, courts have historically struggled with 
the qualification and quantification of such a construct and its relationship to 
behavior.  Following the John Hinckley insanity trial in which psychiatric experts 
battled about Hinckley’s ability to control his behavior with a history of delusions, 
the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA) advocated for the abolition of the American Law Institute’s (ALI) volitional 
insanity prong.  The APA stated, the “line between an irresistible impulse and an 
impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and dusk.”64  
The ABA criticized volitional tests by noting there is no valid or reliable basis for 
measuring incapacity for self-control. 
                                                           
 60 See Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous Person, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,205, 43,206 
(Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 549, subpart H).  
 61 Commonwealth v. Boucher, 780 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Mass. 2002).  
 62 In re Detention of Wilber W., 53 P.3d 1145, 1151 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).  
 63 People v. Superior Court (In re Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949, 954 (Cal. 2002).  
 64 Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Statement on the 
Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983); see also John Q. La Fond, The 
Future of Involuntary Civil Commitment in the U.S.A. After Kansas v. Hendricks, 18 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 153, 156 (2000).  
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Laws that address volitional impairments lead to psychiatric disagreement, error, 
and interrater reliability issues as there is “no way to calibrate the degree of 
impairment of behavioral controls.”65  Critics argue that the Crane Court’s “serious 
difficulty” rule assumes that people have freewill, yet one author asserts, “[t]he 
science of the mind simply has not advanced far enough to permit experts to know 
with any confidence what decisions were ‘controllable’ and which ones were not.”66  
Conversely, some argue that clinicians can assess cognitive and volitional standards 
pertaining to the insanity defense for example, with some degree of interrater 
reliability.67  The problem is not only assessing interrater reliability, but the accuracy 
and validity of what we are trying to measure and whether we can precisely measure 
volition.   
Statutes, case law, and clinical behavioral data do not provide a clear conception 
of what we are trying to identify and measure when we assess volition and freewill.  
The Federal Bureau of Prisons has been working on creating, in a sense, user 
guidelines and suggestions relevant to the assessment of sex offending issues as 
applied to the AWA civil commitment statute, and in particular whether an offender 
has a “serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child 
molestation if released.”  
The BOP indicates that a mental health professional may consider any of the 
following information (not an exhaustive or complete list) pertaining to serious 
difficulty refraining: 
1. to the person’s repeated contact, or attempted contact, with one or more 
victims; 
 
2. to the person’s denial of or inability to appreciate the wrongfulness, 
harmfulness, or likely consequences of engaging in sexually violent 
conduct or child molestation; 
 
3. to, established through interviewing, and testing of the person, or other 
risk assessment tools, that are relied upon by mental health 
professionals; 
 
                                                           
 65 Richard Bonnie, Morality, Equality, and Expertise: Renegotiating the Relationship 
Between Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD.  PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 17 
(1984); see ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 202 (Jules Coleman ed.,1991); Stephen J. Morse, 
Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1587 (1994) (stating that people can 
exercise control over their behaviors when they have well developed self awareness and self 
monitoring, fear consequences of their negative behavior, display accurate cognitive 
perception and rational reasoning, desire moral behavior, have control over emotions, exhibit 
empathy for their behaviors, have the ability to suppress desires, and exert good judgment and 
practical wisdom).  
 66 David L. Faigman, Making Moral Judgments Through Behavioural Science: The 
‘Substantial Lack of Volitional Control’ Requirement in Civil Commitments, 2 L. PROBABILITY 
& RISK 309, 315 (2003).   
 67 Richard Rogers, APA’s Position on the Insanity Defense, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 840, 840 
(1987). 
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4. to, established by forensic indicators of inability to control conduct, 
such as:  
a) offending while under supervision 
b) engaging in offense(s) when likely to get caught 
c) statement(s) of intent to reoffend, or 
d) admission of inability of difficulty to control behavior; or 
e) indicating successful completion of, or failure to complete, a sex 
offender treatment program. 
 
These factors may intuitively tap into some issues that lead to volitional 
impairment, however, are any of them empirically associated with difficulty 
controlling or refraining?  For example, having multiple victims as outlined in the 
first item may indicate evidence of sexual deviance.  The second item appears to 
address the issue of legal insanity such as appreciating wrongfulness and 
consequences of one’s sex offending acts.  The third item suggests that an expert’s 
use of risk assessment instruments might assist in assessing degree of impairment of 
one’s serious difficulty in refraining.  Finally, the fourth item includes some 
descriptive elements that in common sense appear to relate to inability to control 
one’s sex offending but they are doubtfully related scientifically to the AWA 
volitional construct.   
These items provided by the BOP will likely fail in defining one’s serious 
difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation because these 
premises lack a clear conception of what we are trying to measure and identify.68  
However, courts will likely accept expert testimony that is relevant and offered in 
good faith despite many experts’ exhaustive discourses on the theoretical 
components of volitional impairment.  
E.  A Closer Look at Expert Witness Assessment of Volition 
Pertinent to the AWA it is important to address how experts evaluate sex 
offenders’ inability to control their sex offending behaviors. 
There are no formal psychological and even neuropsychological assessment 
instruments that will provide certain answers to the processes by which an individual 
decides on and actually commits a particular behavior.  The psychological literature 
provides no clear cut definitions on how we should measure self-control, freewill 
and volition.69  Most theories are quantitative in nature, implying degrees to which 
individuals possess self-control and elements that influence self-control.70  Further, 
while many experts and scholars view self-control as being associated with criminal 
behavior, it is not clear whether individuals abandon self-control or ultimately lose 
control and therefore if the concept may be considered on a continuum.  Self control 
                                                           
 68 Robert F. Schopp, Mario J. Scalora & Marc Pearce, Expert Testimony and Professional 
Judgment: Psychological Expertise and Commitment as a Sexual Predator After Hendricks, 
15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 120, 127 (1999).  
 69 PHILIP WITT & MARY ALICE CONROY, EVALUATION OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS 
31 (2009). 
 70 Cynthia Calkins Mercado, Robert F. Schopp & Brian H. Bornstein, Evaluating Sex 
Offenders Under Sexually Violent Predator Laws: How Might Mental Health Professionals 
Conceptualize the Notion of Volitional Impairment?, 10 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 289, 
302 (2005).  
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and freewill over behavior superimposes criminal behavior including the traits of 
impulsivity, risk taking, lack of empathy, poor behavioral controls, immediate 
gratification, deficits in considering consequences of behavior, low frustration 
tolerance, and lack of insight.71  
Scholars have been thoughtful in considering elements pertaining to volitional 
impairment.72  Evaluators should assess whether the offender’s sexual offending has 
an enduring driven quality and lacks the ability to make meaningful choices.  Does 
the offender disregard personal consequences and minimize consequences of his 
offending behaviors?  Is the offender able to delay sexual gratification for long 
periods of time?  Does the offender verbalize a lack of control, have a chronic and 
lengthy history of sexual offending, lack offense planning, and commit some of their 
offending while under the influences of substances which ultimately inhibits his 
behaviors?  
Significant concern has been raised about the lack of empirical support regarding 
whether persons diagnosed with paraphilias and/or personality disorders are unable 
to control their behavior.73  Human behavior is a complex phenomenon based on a 
combination of affective, motivational, and cognitive elements.  An offender’s 
choice to repeatedly act on aberrant desires does not provide evidence of volitional 
impairment.74   
Recently, researchers investigated legal professionals, psychologists, and mock 
jurors germane to their decision making of volitional impairment in hypothetical 
sexually violent predator proceedings.75  Results indicate that these participants 
heavily considered the offenders’ history of sexual violence, verbalized lack of 
control over sex offending behavior, history of planning and premeditation of the 
offenses, and the context of the civil commitment hearing while discounting the 
effects of substance abuse on offending behaviors.  
Experts are challenged with determining whether a sex offender is lacking in 
ability or will to control.  These questions are not subject to quantifiable terms and 
answers.  For example, utilizing actuarial risk assessment instruments includes 
incorporating a mechanical procedure which overlooks the clinically complex 
elements of assessing volitional abilities in relationship to the offender’s mental 
abnormality.76  Simply, one cannot equate high scores on actuarial risk assessment 
instruments with one’s ability to control or not control their behaviors because one 
cannot generalize from the many to the individual.  The sex offender normative 
                                                           
 71 Id. at 305. 
 72 Cynthia Calkins Mercado, Brian Bornstein & Robert Schopp, Decision-Making About 
Volitional Impairment in Sexually Violent Predators, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 587, 590 
(2006); see also RICHARD ROGERS & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC 
PRACTICE: MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL LAW 348 (2005).  
 73 Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 250, 263(1998).  See generally Calkins Mercado et al., supra note 70, at 305; Schopp & 
Sturgis, supra note 42, at 440; Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 505, 521 (1998).  
 74 Robert F. Schopp, Civil Commitment and Sexual Predators: Competence and 
Condemnation, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 323, 342 (1998). 
 75 See Calkins Mercado et al., supra note 72, at 591. 
 76 See ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 72. 
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samples on these instruments and the sex offenders we evaluate and compare to 
these norms all have different etiological pathways and emotional, cognitive, and 
behavioral processes that led to their offending.  Some offenders scoring high on 
actuarial risk assessment instruments may indeed be high risk offenders, yet willfully 
choose their criminal sex offending behavior and not possess significant problems 
refraining from their acts. 
Let us briefly examine a clinical case example.  Consider a sex offender who is 
sexually interested only in children and he has a mental condition, pedophilia, which 
creates drives that are unbearable and overriding.  He has a history of numerous sex 
offending behaviors against children that are frequent and persistent.  He suffers 
from abnormal sexual fantasies towards children and frequently masturbates to these 
fantasies until climax.  He seeks out children to fulfill his masturbatory fantasies 
even when at risk to do so and even after being imprisoned on a few prior occasions.  
This offender may be considered by some to lack volition and most pedophiles 
would not likely qualify in this category.  Those less deviant pedophiles may fall in 
the “typical recidivist” category and simply choose to commit their crimes against 
children rather than lacking an ability to control and will to control.   
As one author describes the atypical offender child molester who would qualify 
for commitment,  
 
hypersexual severity, which makes this man’s psychological 
condition a SVP-relevant ‘mental disorder.’ . . . [T]his man’s 
deviant interest is the current behind his sexual offending.  The 
hyper-sexuality provides the voltage.  It is the voltage, not the 
current, ‘overpowering’ this man’s ability to use the switch and 
restrain sexual behavior.  Our TSR [typical sexual recidivist] has the 
same current but not the same voltage; he can use his switch if he 
chooses . . . It is this man’s hyper-sexuality that drives his paraphilia 
to the point where he is ‘made’ dangerous beyond typical criminal 
volition . . . . 77 
 
When considering diagnostic issues, one’s particular diagnosis may explain little 
of his functional capacity pertaining to volition over his behavior.78  Just because one 
suffers from pedophilia does not mean that he is that functionally impaired.  
Although most individuals who are committed will ultimately qualify for a 
paraphilic diagnosis, the key issue in determining volitional impairment is to address 
in what ways the mental condition interferes with behavioral control. 
Researchers who study Florida civil commitment detainees79 assert that in 
Florida, no diagnosis by itself meets the legal threshold for commitment because it 
must be also demonstrated that the individual is likely to commit future acts of 
sexual violence.  Therefore, a combination of a diagnosis predisposing the person to 
sexual violence, and a finding of “likely” to commit future sexual violence are 
required in that state and neither factor alone are sufficient to justify commitment.  
                                                           
 77 Daniel F. Montaldi, The Logic of Sexually Violent Predator Status in the United States 
of America, 2 SEXUAL OFFENDER TREATMENT 1, 14 (2007). 
 78 Id. at 15. 
 79 Levenson, supra note 40, at 364. 
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Similarly, when considering AWA commitments, the statute includes both a 
finding of mental illness, abnormality, or disorder and a finding of serious difficulty 
from refraining from sexually violent conduct or acts of child molestation.  As we 
know, the terms “mental illness,” “abnormality,” or “disorder,” are legal definitions 
written into the AWA law as conditions required for commitment.  The mere 
presence of any of these terms is not legally sufficient to commit someone; rather, 
the condition must predispose the offender to future serious difficulty refraining in 
their sexual behavior.  Critically, one’s clinical psychiatric diagnoses as displayed 
through his behavioral, cognitive, and emotional processes may not only predispose 
him to reoffending, but overpower his volitional capacities to not reoffend.  If an 
offender simply chooses to continue to reoffend, then he should not qualify for 
commitment.  
Scholars have attentively considered factors relevant to volition that should be 
addressed in AWA hearings despite some of their ambiguous empirical connections 
to willfulness: 80 
 
1) Lack of choicefulness (investigate evidence of planning or rational 
decisions); 
 
2) Disregard for personal consequences (offended without any regard for 
personal consequences and failed to reduce likelihood of their 
apprehension); 
 
3) Incapacity for delay (inability to delay sexual deviations and 
gratification); 
 
4) Evidence that sexual deviations formed a discernible and stable pattern; 
 
5) Evidence of delusions and/or command hallucinations associated with 
sexual deviations; 
 
6) Evidence of manic based behavior associated with sexual deviations; 
 
7) Evidence of uncontrollable impulses associated with severe paraphilias; 
 
8) Evidence that the volitional impairment results directly in a risk of 
sexual recidivism. 
 
Other researchers have listed methods for determining the presence of volitional 
impairment including: existence of personality disorder combined with previous sex 
offending; existence or non-existence of a paraphilia; self report that volitional 
impairment is present; neuropsychological testing indicating impaired impulse 
control.81  
One can argue that the simple presence of a paraphilia disorder, such as 
pedophilia, makes a predisposition of volitional impairment obvious.  However, the 
                                                           
 80 See ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 72. 
 81 Rebecca L. Jackson & Derek T. Hess, Evaluation for Civil Commitment of Sex 
Offenders: A Survey of Experts, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 425, 436 (2007). 
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strength of the deviant sexual drive and its relationship to inability to resist one’s 
behavior is the important element.82   
Scholars have also cited potentially promising areas of scientific inquiry 
regarding diminished behavioral control with its roots being psychophysiological 
and neurological in nature.83  Various brain abnormalities focus on frontal and 
temporal lobe areas have been indicated to be associated with impulse control 
dysfunction, deviant sexual behavior, and personality disorders, including 
psychopathy.84  
What makes this process of assessing will power so difficult is the lack of 
empirical findings providing us with quantifiable definitions of volition.  
Accordingly, one may question whether Leroy Hendricks’s admissions about not 
being able to control his sexual urges and likelihood of acting on them again in the 
future has any empirical foundation in his likelihood of future offending, or inability 
to refrain from sex offense crimes in the future.  However, most clinicians would 
heavily weigh an offender’s admissions that he cannot control his sex offending 
behaviors and would consider himself as high risk in their support for the offender’s 
commitment.  
Former Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger addressed the irresistible impulse 
label—It “has always been a misleading concept because it has connotations of some 
sudden outburst of impulse and completely overlooks the fact that people do a lot of 
weird and strange and unlawful things as a result of not just sudden impulse but long 
brooding and disturbed emotional makeup.”85  
Similarly, the field of forensic psychology and psychiatry lacks reliable standards 
in assessing and diagnosing volitional impairments.86  When considering court 
                                                           
 82 DENNIS DOREN, EVALUATING SEX OFFENDERS: A MANUAL FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT AND 
BEYOND 32 (2002).  
 83 See Holly A. Miller, Amy E. Amenta & Mary Alice Conroy, Sexually Violent Predator 
Evaluations: Empirical Evidence, Strategies for Professionals, and Research Directions, 29 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 29-54 (2005).  
 84 See Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio & Antonio R. Damasio, Emotion, Decision 
Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex, 10 CEREBRAL CORTEX 295, 306 (2000); R.J.R. Blair & 
Lisa Cipolotti, Impaired Social Response Reversal: A Case of ‘Acquired Sociopathy,’ 123 
BRAIN 1122, 1122-41 (2000); Jeffery Burns & Russell Swerdlow, Right Orbitofrontal Tumor 
with Pedophilia Symptom and Structional Apaxia Sign, 60 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 437, 440 
(2003); Kent A. Kiehl et al.,  Semantic and Affective Processing in Psychopaths: An Event-
Related Potential (ERP) Study, 36 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 765, 770 (1999); Kent A. Kiehl et al., 
An Event-Related Potential Investigation of Response Inhibition in Schizophrenia and 
Psychopathy, 48 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 210, 215 (2000); Adrian Raine et al., 1134, 1141 
(2003); Jeffery L. Saver & Antonio R. Damasio, Preserved Access and Processing of Social 
Knowledge in a Patient with Acquired Sociopathy Due to Ventromedial Frontal Damage, 29 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1241, 1245 (1991) .  
 85 GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK 
FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 67 (2nd ed. 1997).    
 86 See Bradley Grinage, Volitional Impairment and the Sexually Violent Predator, 48 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 861, 862 (2003) (indicating that the field of psychiatry lacks a valid or reliable 
method to infer a patient’s volitional capacity and no uniform clinical definition exists).  The 
medical literature describes volitional capacity loosely as impulse control and compulsive 
behavior.  The medical literature also alludes that elements of volition may be psychiatrically 
evaluated. 
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testimony in AWA cases, some scholars recommend that forensic examiners simply 
describe symptom behavioral patterns and offender characteristics rather than offer 
definitive opinions on volitional capacity because the construct is unknown and 
ambiguous.87 
F.  Volitional Diagnostic Dilemmas: Paraphilias, Antisocial Personality Disorder, 
and Psychopathy 
There appear to be two camps of adversarial experts who hold contrary beliefs as 
to the existence, reliability, validity, and utility of various psychiatric diagnoses 
applicable in sex offender civil commitment proceedings.  Essentially, defense 
experts seriously question these diagnoses while prosecution experts utilize them 
freely.   
The AWA civil commitment cases will be burdened with many sex offenders 
who suffer from pedophilia due to widespread federal child-related sex crimes 
including possession of child pornography, online solicitation activity, and sexual 
crimes against children.  Despite this trend, this author will describe some 
psychiatric diagnostic dilemmas typically found in civil commitment cases 
throughout the U.S. 
The most common diagnoses/constructs relevant to AWA proceedings, some 
which are under heavy scrutiny by forensic mental health professionals, will likely 
include: 
1) Pedophilia; 
2) Hebephilia; 
3) Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified-Nonconsent (rape subtype); 
4) Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD); 
5) Psychopathy (severe criminal personality); 
6) Exhibitionism; 
7) Substance abuse, dependency and intoxicated states. 
 
As previously discussed, the issue of inability to control and the choice to not 
control or lacking the will to control, similar to an irresistible impulse and an 
impulse not resisted, will often lie within an offender’s diagnosis as labeled by an 
expert witness.   The finding of how functionally impaired the offender is relevant to 
controlling his sex offending behaviors is paramount more so than only considering 
the psychiatric diagnosis he carries.     
There is a debate about whether intense, impulsive, and sometimes abnormal 
sexual behaviors should be explained by conditions other than paraphilias.  
Accordingly, some sex offenders who are diagnosed with paraphilias and lack some 
control over their sexually deviant impulses are often viewed similarly to those who 
suffer from obsessive compulsive disorders.88  Similarly, paraphilic disorders have 
                                                           
 87 See Calkins Mercado et al., supra note 70, at 307. 
 88 Richard B. Krueger & Meg S. Kaplan, The Paraphilic and Hypersexual Disorders: An 
Overview, 7 J. PSYCHIATRIC PRAC. 391, 399 (2001); see also Robert Barth & Bill Kinder, The 
Mislabeling of Sexual Impulsivity, J. SEXUAL & MARITAL THERAPY 13, 15 (1997); Donald 
Black, Compulsive Sexual Behavior: Area Review, 4 J. PRACT. PSYCHIATRY BEHAV. HEALTH 
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been compared and contrasted to nonparaphilic hyper-sexuality disorders.89  Scholars 
have argued that paraphilic disorders referred to as nonparaphilic sexual addictions, 
hypersexual disorders,  or sexual compulsivity include socially sanctioned sexual 
fantasies, urges and activities (i.e., compulsive masturbation, pornography 
dependence, cyber sex chat rooms) that increase in intensity and frequency as to 
cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning.90   
Paraphilias on the other hand are currently defined in the DSM-IV-TR as 
“recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving 
1) nonhuman objects, 2) suffering or humiliation of oneself or one’s partner, or 3) 
children or other nonconsenting persons for a period of at least 6 months” that causes 
clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning.91   
Important to this diagnosis is recent literature addressing the question of whether 
a paraphilia can be based on behavior alone without evidence of sexual fantasies 
and/or urges.92  The definition lists “sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or 
behaviors,” suggesting that behaviors alone are sufficient for the diagnosis.  Further, 
the DSM-IV authors emphasized that it is behavior that most typically brings 
individuals to clinical attention.93  However, the same authors have acknowledged a 
mistake and urge for a correction in the DSM-V in that their intention was not to 
allow the diagnosis of a paraphilia based on behavior (often criminal sexual 
behavior) alone.  Diagnosing a paraphilia based on behaviors alone would distort the 
division between mental disorder and criminality and decisions pertaining to 
indefinite commitment should not be based on a misreading of a poorly worded 
DSM-IV listed symptom.94  These authors recommend a removal of the current 
terms “or behaviors” and a reinstatement of the requirements of sexual urges and 
fantasies.  
This issue is a much contested concern because many SVP examiners only rely 
on the police reports detailing the sexual crimes without any other support of a 
paraphilic condition.  In their defense, these experts may not have access to other 
data, i.e., fantasies and masturbatory practices, given the tendency for offenders to 
                                                           
 89 Martin P. Kafka & John Hennen, Hypersexual Desire in Males: Are Males with 
Paraphilias Different from Males with Paraphilia-Related Disorders?, 15 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. 
RES. & TREATMENT  307, 311 (2003).  
 90 Martin P. Kafka & John Hennen, The Paraphilia-Related Disorders: An Empirical 
Investigation of Non-Paraphilic Hypersexuality Disorders in Outpatient Males, 25 J. SEX & 
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347 (1992).  
 91 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 44 (discussing diagnoses including exhibitionism, 
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not admit to these experiences during civil commitment examinations.  In contrast, 
an examiner could assume that one’s sexual behaviors are based in part by sexual 
urges and these two elements together may comprise a paraphilia.  
Importantly, some experts believe that only sex offenders who carry paraphilia 
diagnoses should be committed as the disorders designate a deviant sexual 
preference, whereas antisocial personality disorder is indicative of general 
criminality and willful behavior and should not be cited as the sole disorder 
supporting mental abnormality for commitment.95   However, some experts argue 
that APD alone is a qualifying disorder for civil commitment.96 
1.  Antisocial Personality Disorder 
Given the contradictory holding in Crane associated to volitional impairment and 
its allowance for a sex offender to be committed based on an emotional disorder or 
personality disorder, there has been heightened scholarly debate as to whether 
antisocial personality disorder is enough to commit someone indefinitely.97  Many 
APD sex offenders may not carry paraphilia diagnoses and their sex offending may 
be one of the many antisocial behaviors in which they engage.  In essence, the APD 
diagnosis will likely not adequately differentiate the typical recidivist from the 
atypical recidivist outlined in Crane and it does not completely address impairment 
in volition as a diagnosis standing alone.   
For example, consider a single middle-aged career criminal with a juvenile and 
adult history of violent and nonviolent offenses and no history of sex offending.  He 
enters a house and during his burglary, he commits an opportunistic rape against a 
stranger female occupant (offender takes goods of value and sex from the victim).  
This sex offender will score high on some actuarial risk assessment measures in 
major part due to his nonsexual criminal history despite only one detected sex 
offense on record.    
In contrast, consider a single middle-aged offender with prior nonviolent criminal 
offenses and one prior rape offense who burglarizes a home with a specific intent of 
finding a woman to rape.  He collects her underwear and experiences sexual 
gratification and pleasure in raping, ultimately demonstrating symptoms of 
paraphilic behavior (falling short of a paraphilia diagnosis due to a six month 
                                                           
 95 See Vognsen & Phenix, supra note 53. see also Patrick Lussier, The Criminal Activity of 
Sexual Offenders in Adulthood: Revisiting the Specialization Debate, 17 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. 
RES. & TREATMENT 269, 269 (2005) (the interested reader should also consider the generalist 
versus specialist debate of sex offending).  Some scholars question whether sex offenders are 
specialists who tend to repeat sexual crimes or whether they are merely generalist criminals 
who do not tend to restrict themselves to one particular type of crime.  
 96 Gregory DeClue, Paraphilia NOS (Nonconsenting) and Antisocial Personality 
Disorder, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 495, 499 (2006); see also Adams v. Bartow, 330 F.3d 
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offender cannot control his sex offending and ultimately the diagnosis by itself can support 
civil commitment); United States v. Wilkinson, No. 07-12061-MLW, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
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literature with sex offending to such an extent as paraphilic disorders. 
 97 See Vognsen and Phenix, supra note 53, at 441.  
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behavior requirement).  This offender may have a similar actuarial risk score as the 
former case, but yet be driven to rape by different causative pathways and possess 
heightened deviant volitional impairments more so than the first offender.  
The question in AWA proceedings will focus on which offenders experience 
serious difficulty refraining from their sexually violent acts.  It may be difficult to 
prove that either one of these offenders has serious difficulty in refraining, yet a 
finding of likelihood of reoffending based on actuarial estimates of probability could 
very well occur in these cases.   
Many offenders with APD are not sex offenders and the APD diagnosis does not 
require sex offending behavior.  In fact, about 60 to 80% percent of all prisoners 
incarcerated in the U.S. meet diagnostic criteria for APD and many of them are not 
sex offenders.98  With such high prevalence of the disorder within offender 
populations, APD as a diagnosis may lack validity.99  Further, the thresholds for the 
diagnosis provided by the DSM-IV are mostly unexplained, softly justified, and 
recent investigation is questioning the discriminant validity of APD and personality 
disorders in general within the DSM-IV.100  These offenders with APD have an 
ability to exercise a choice more so than the sex offender who has a paraphilic sexual 
deviancy disorder.  Simply put, it can be argued that APD is a catchall diagnosis for 
persons with socially problematic behavior and because it does little to distinguish 
offenders, its validity is questioned.    
2.  Psychopathy 
The dimension or construct of psychopathy101 (affective, interpersonal, lifestyle, 
and behavioral components of a severe criminal personality), similar but yet distinct 
from APD, is especially relevant to SVP proceedings because of its prevalence in 
those high risk sex offenders who are ultimately civilly committed.102  Psychopathy 
has been known to be correlated with outcomes of general criminal, violent, and to a 
lesser degree, sexually violent behavior.103    
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The use of the instrument to assess psychopathic traits, (Psychopathy Checklist-
Revised: PCL-R) is utilized by many experts and notably the highest risk offenders 
may be the ones with a paraphilia and antisocial personality disorder diagnosis and 
presence of significant psychopathic traits.   
Although the personality dimension of psychopathy may show promise with its 
link to sexual offending, its usefulness for the prosecutor may be more in its 
prejudicial impact on the offender as a pejorative label.  Current research tells us that 
prosecution experts in SVP proceedings often find offenders to have higher levels of 
psychopathic traits than defense experts. 104  The construct of psychopathy has 
weaknesses including validity, test-retest stability and generalizability, life-course 
stability, and comorbidity with other psychiatric diagnoses.105   Finally, psychopathy 
can be characterized as a dimension of personality, thus its use in legal proceedings 
is questionable because it is not listed in the DSM-IV-TR and one cannot be 
diagnosed with it because it is not a formal psychiatric diagnosis.  
When considering volitional impairment on behavior, some research informs us 
that psychopaths have difficulty incorporating new environmental feedback into their 
decision making, they are impaired with their abilities to inhibit their behavior, and 
they suffer from low cortical arousal in their brain.106  In fact, researchers are citing 
growing evidence that even psychopathic individuals have impairment in amygdala 
functioning that leads to deficits in instrumental emotional learning, expression of 
basic emotional reactions, attention, reward and punishment processing, and 
socialization.107  Whether these psychopathic traits that have their roots in 
biopsychosocial phenomenon can be accurately measured has yet to be seen.  
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26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss2/3
2012] THE ADAM WALSH CHILD PROTECTION AND SAFETY ACT 333 
While it can be argued that psychopathy and APD are not disorders that fit into 
the traditional medical model of involuntary civil commitment, scholars cite ample 
legal opinion evidence to the contrary.108  Simply, the law answers the question as 
legislatures are including the term personality disorder as a requisite condition for 
civil commitment and many courts are agreeing that APD is enough in rendering 
offenders likely to commit future sex offenses.109  
The dilemma remains as to whether a personality disorder diagnosis alone and/or 
the presence of psychopathy, qualifies a sex offender to have a serious difficulty 
refraining from future sexual conduct.110  Offenders with APD and psychopathy have 
control over most if not all of their behaviors and are considered unwilling to restrain 
their impulses.  Expert testimony should focus on sexual deviancy facets of APD 
rather than opportunistic sex offending only. 111  Despite experts providing clinical 
answers to this debate, the issue is subject to a legal answer, namely based on the 
holding in Crane.112  Accordingly, personality constructs will often be admitted in 
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court to explain volitional impairments, ultimately satisfying requisites for 
commitment.113 
3.  Paraphilia Disorder NOS (nonconsenting-rape type) 
Another diagnostic dilemma occurring in SVP state civil commitment 
proceedings is whether the diagnosis Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified-
Nonconsent (rape subtype) exists as psychiatric diagnosis in the DSM-IV-TR.  This 
diagnosis is common amongst offenders qualifying for civil commitment in state 
courts.  In Arizona, this diagnosis has been found to occur in 56% of their SVP 
proceedings while in Washington its prevalence is nearly 43%.114   
Numerous examiners utilize this diagnosis to indicate that an offender has an 
affinity to rape, enjoys raping, and obtains sexual arousal from raping yet does not 
enjoy the repetitive infliction of suffering on the victim which would indicate 
features of sexual sadism.  Many practitioners endorse that a paraphilia nonconsent 
diagnosis must include an ongoing clear and special lust for the aggressive taking of 
sex and/or a sexualized hostility towards women causing distress and interpersonal 
difficulty.115  However, in practice, many clinicians who endorse this diagnosis 
substantiate it in their evaluations solely by the fact that an offender has two rape 
incidences that occurred over a period of six months or longer, without any history 
of sexually deviant fantasies or other information supporting a diagnosis beyond the 
rape itself.  
The DSM-IV-TR indicates in the definition of paraphilia—”children or other 
nonconsenting persons,”116 yet the manual does not specifically endorse a rape 
subtype relevant to nonconsenting adults who are raped.  Further, the term 
nonconsenting person was apparently meant to apply only to exhibitionism, 
voyeurism, and sadism and not to adult rape victims.117  Subsequently, many 
clinicians assume that an adult rape victim is a nonconsenting person, and if the 
perpetrator has a pattern of this behavior (usually more than one nonconsenting 
                                                           
 113 See Vognsen & Phenix, supra note 53, at 24.  Mental health professionals will likely not 
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 117 See Allen Frances, Shoba Sreenivasan & Linda E. Weinberger, Defining Mental 
Disorder When It Really Counts: DSM-IV-TR and SVP/SDP Statutes, 36 J. AM. ACAD. 
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victim), he would qualify for the diagnosis.  Other experts emphasize that deviant 
sexuality need not be either obligatory or exclusive for a person to meet criteria for a 
diagnosis of paraphilia not otherwise specified; rather, the repetitive coercive sexual 
behavior alone is definitive enough for the diagnosis.118  However, it can be debated 
whether the DSM-IV-TR dictates that repetitive rape cannot be justified on the basis 
of behaviors alone, rather, these behaviors must be based on paraphilic urges and 
fantasies associating the coercive sex to sexual arousal.  One problem remains as to 
whether this viewpoint endorses the repetitive sexual activity as being a product of a 
paraphilia, substance intoxication disinihibition, opportunity, power, control, anger, 
or APD. 119     
Some experts believe the diagnosis is too broad, unreliable, imprecisely defined 
and in essence, a “wastebasket” diagnosis.120  Utilizing the diagnosis may be 
inappropriate as it is not formally listed in the DSM-IV or DSM-IV-TR, it does not 
appear to fit with the intentions of the authors of the DSM, and there is no research 
conducted to establish this diagnosis’s validity.121  Importantly, recent commentary 
by authors of the DSM, indicate that “it was the deliberate intent of DSM-IV to 
exclude any reference in DSM-IV to rape as a paraphilia.  That is why rape is not 
listed under the various examples of paraphilia NOS and is not listed in the DSM-IV 
Index.”122  DSM-IV specifically did not include either rape or nonconsent as an NOS 
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recognized diagnostic principles.  See also Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (No. 00-957), 2001 WL 873316.  But see Frances et al., 
supra note 117 (stating that NOS categories in the DSM-IV-TR are designed to allow 
clinicians to use their clinical judgment for each individual as to whether the symptom cluster 
caused enough distress or impairment to be a mental disorder).  The vagueness in guidelines 
for NOS diagnoses was intentional to permit the clinician flexibility in their diagnostic 
process.   
 122 Allen Frances & Michael B. First, Paraphilia NOS, Nonconsent: Not Ready for the 
Courtroom, J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 39:555–61, at 557 (2011). 
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example, because paraphilic rapism had been considered and ruled out as a 
paraphilia in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third 
Edition (DSM-III), Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third 
Edition, Revised (DSM-III-R), and DSM-IV.  In conclusion, these authors indicate 
that “rape is always a crime and is never, by itself, sufficient evidence of a mental 
disorder.”123  Coincidentally, around the time of writing this Article, an article in the 
Psychiatric Times dated May 12, 2011, by author Allen Frances, M.D., indicated that 
the proposal to include coercive paraphilia as an official diagnosis in the main body 
of DSM-V has been rejected by the American Psychiatric Association due in part to 
insufficient reliability and validity of such a diagnosis.  
When considering the DSM’s historical rejection of a rape paraphilia, a 
Paraphilia Subcommittee was formed in the 1980s to make recommendations to the 
DSM-III-R and they voted against a “paraphilic coercive disorder” due to the small 
amount of offenders who would qualify for sexual arousal to a coercive assault and 
the fact that the disorder could be used in forensic settings to exculpate rapists.124  
Moreover, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) task force cites that the 
DSM-IV has not classified paraphilic rapism as a mental disorder.  They recognized 
that some researchers believe that a small group of rapists have diagnostic features 
similar to those with other paraphilias.  However, it is unclear what percentage of 
rapists would be diagnosed as having such a coercive paraphilic rape disorder, and 
the ability to make the diagnosis with a sufficient degree of validity and reliability 
remains problematic (there was insufficient empirical data to support the disorder).  
Conversely, those supporting such a diagnosis cite other research indicating a 
tendency for some rapists to be sexually aroused to nonconsenting sexual 
interactions as measured by plethysmographic instruments.125  In fact, some research 
has shown that about 60% of rapists show equal or greater arousal to rape stories 
than to consenting sex stories compared to 10% of men with no history of rape.126  
These data would suggest that there is a sexually deviant arousal pattern to 
nonconsenting sexual interaction for some rapists and hence a paraphilia disorder 
nonconsent type would be appropriate in some cases.  This would also suggest that 
some APD offenders who have an affinity to rape may not show deviant arousal 
patterns in laboratory studies. 
Ultimately, the paraphilia NOS nonconsenting condition is a weak construct 
given a lack of a set of denied criteria and consequently there is a danger of using the 
diagnosis as a catch-all diagnosis for offenders with a history of sex offenses for 
whom the examiner cannot clearly identity a specific diagnostic category.127 
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4.  Pedophilia 
One of the most common diagnoses that is easily identified and supported 
amongst state civilly committed sex offenders is pedophilia.  In Florida, about 39% 
of the offenders committed carry this diagnosis,128 while in Minnesota, about 35% of 
the committed offenders were diagnosed the same.129  About 63% of committed sex 
offenders in Arizona were diagnosed with pedophilia130, while about 59% of those 
committed in Wisconsin carry the disorder.131  
Important to the substance of this Article is the fact that most sex offenders being 
considered for federal civil commitment via the AWA will have child victims either 
through hands-on offending across state lines, possession of child pornography, or 
solicitation pursuant to a child or adolescent victim.  Consequently, experts will be 
asked to determine the presence or absence of pedophilia in order to substantiate or 
reject the diagnosis as the mental disorder, abnormality, or disorder required for 
commitment.  
Recently there has been strenuous debate on the utility of the diagnosis of 
pedophilia.132  For example, an area of disagreement of experts is whether pedophilia 
and other paraphilias qualify as mental disorder and genuine psychopathology.133 
When considering the reliability and validity of the paraphilias, there has been 
question on the psychometric quality of the diagnosis of pedophilia.134  Particular 
attention has been paid to the problems with interrater reliability and test-retest 
reliability of the diagnosis.135  Debates have centered around the ambiguous terms of 
“recurrent” and “intense” within the criteria as well as the consistency of clinicians 
to accurately assess whether behaviors, urges, and fantasies cause distress or 
impairment.  Though the diagnostic criteria for the disorder appears straightforward, 
problems with the reliability of the disorder include the subjective manner in which 
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information about sexual interests is combined by examiners and the dilemma 
experts experience when assessing sex offenders against children as they often are 
unwilling to admit to deviant sexual thoughts and practices.136 
When considering the assessment of pedophilic interests, scholars have 
developed a brief screening scale which includes the following variables: any male 
victim, more than one victim, any prepubescent victims, and any extrafamilial 
victims.137  These sex offense history variables were associated with phallometric 
assessment data differentiating pedophiles from nonpedophiles.138 
While roughly 50 to 70% of pedophiles can be diagnosed as having another 
paraphilia such as exhibitionism or voyeurism, multiple paraphilia offenders are 
more likely to commit future sex offenses. 139  While the prevalence of pedophilia 
among men who commit sexual offenses against children is about 50%,140 pedophilic 
child molesters on average commit about ten times more sexual offenses against 
children than nonpedophilic child molesters.141  While only about 7% of pedophiles 
identify themselves as exclusively sexually attracted to children, this exclusive type 
is more likely to have a history of multiple child victims and are considered more 
likely to sexually reoffend in the future.142  Research indicates that pedophiles who 
offend boys are much more likely to have more victims and committed more 
offenses than those who have offended against girls.143 
5.  Hebephilia 
Relevant to the AWA, many federal sex offenders have hands-on, solicitation, 
and pornography victims in this hebephilic (pubescent-post-pubescent) age group.  
Importantly, hebephilia is not a paraphilia diagnosis recognized by the DSM-IV-TR 
                                                           
 136 MICHAEL C. SETO, PEDOPHILIA AND SEXUAL OFFENDING AGAINST CHILDREN: THEORY 
ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION 24-25 (2008). 
 137 Michael C. Seto & Martin L. Lalumiére, A Brief Screening Scale to Identify Pedophilic 
Interests Among Child Molesters, 12 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 15, 16 (2001). 
 138 Id.  
 139 Gene G. Abel et al., Multiple Paraphilic Diagnoses Among Sex Offenders, 16 BULL. 
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 153 (1988); Lisa J. Cohen & Igor I. Galynker, Clinical Features of 
Pedophilia and Implications for Treatment, 8 J. PSYCHIATRIC PRAC. 276, 281 (2002); Nancy 
Raymond et al., Psychiatric Comorbidity in Pedophilic Sex Offenders, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
786, 787 (1999).  
 140 SETO, supra note 136, at 8. 
 141 GENE G. ABEL & NORA HARLOW, THE STOP MOLESTATION BOOK 9 (2001), available at 
http://www.childmolestationprevention.org/pdfs/study.pdf. 
 142 Id. at 11.   
 143 Gene G. Abel et al., Self-Reported Sex Crimes of Nonincarcerated Paraphiliacs, 2 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3, 22 (1987). The authors found that among nonincarcerated 
nonincest related pedophiles, heterosexual pedophiles on average reported abusing 19.8 
children and committing 23.2 acts whereas homosexual pedophiles had abused 150.2 children 
and committed 281.7 acts.  
32https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss2/3
2012] THE ADAM WALSH CHILD PROTECTION AND SAFETY ACT 339 
and has come under recent brutal attack by some clinicians, challenging the 
conception that sexual interests in pubescent minors imply a mental disorder.144   
A key feature of the definition of pedophilia is the age and pubertal status of the 
children of interest which has a typical age threshold of thirteen years.  In contrast, 
hebephilia is the sexual preference for pubescent children and often is considered 
sexual preference for females ages thirteen to sixteen years of age145 or eleven or 
twelve to fourteen years of age.146  The ability to distinguish pedophiles from 
hebephiles concerns the problems with the variability and definitions of pubertal 
onset in children and the decreasing age of pubertal onset.147  The DSM-IV-TR 
draws the distinction between pathological age-related sexual preferences as adult 
sexual arousal to prepubescent is considered pathological and adult arousal to 
pubescent and postpubescent is non-pathological.    
Pedophiles can be distinguished from hebephiles as the latter include a more 
intense interest in having reciprocal sexual affairs or relationships with children; they 
are more opportunistic in their offending, and they have better developed social 
skills and better post-treatment progress than pedophiles.148   
Current research has revealed that hebephilia exists as a discernable erotic age-
preference apparently separate and distinct from pedophilia.149  Blanchard and his 
colleagues studied men who verbally reported maximum sexual attraction to 
pubescent children and found they had greater penile responses to depictions of 
pubescent children than to depictions of younger or older persons.150  Therefore, 
there was a remarkable consistency between the offenders’ self-reported age 
preferences and their phallometric results.151  Penile responses distinguished these 
men from those who reported maximum attraction to prepubescent children and 
those who reported sexual attraction to adults.152   Some offenders have repeatedly 
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sexually assaulted pubescent victims and have responded most strongly to laboratory 
stimuli depicting pubescent more so than those depicting prepubescents and 
adults.153  Consequently, the authors report the DSM-IV-TR shortcomings in 
diagnosing paraphilias and offer recommendations such as replacing the diagnosis of 
pedophilia with pedohebephilia and allowing clinicians to specify subtypes, i.e., 
Sexually Attracted to Children Younger than 11 (Pedophilic Type), Sexually 
Attracted to Children ages 11-14 (Hebepihlic Type), or Sexually Attracted to Both 
(Pedohebephilic Type).154 
Blanchard’s study has come under scrutiny by scholars for various reasons.155 
First, there is a contention that the term hebephilia as diagnosed under paraphilia 
NOS is not widely accepted nor is there a professional consensus among practicing 
clinicians of such a diagnosis.  Secondly, there is a lack of consistent research 
supporting the diagnosis.  Thirdly, specific to the study, scholars have noted a 
methodological limitation including the absence of models aged fifteen to eighteen 
(mid to late adolescence) among the phallometric stimuli.156  Therefore, the authors 
of the study could not determine whether the adult offenders, who were aroused to 
early-stage adolescence, might also be equally or more aroused to mid to late aged 
adolescents.  Accordingly, the judgment to assign behavior as pathological should 
not be based on phallometric data alone, rather it should also consider the extent to 
which the behavior is abnormal in one’s particular culture.157  
Other empirical data has refuted the perception that hebephiles are sexually 
deviant.  In particular, research has revealed heterosexual men to be sexually aroused 
by adolescents158 and that both pedophiles and a control group could be distinguished 
in their sexual arousal to prepubescent stimuli but both groups showed similar 
arousal patterns to stimuli in the hebephilic age range.159  Further, research has 
revealed no evidence of deviant sexual arousal patterns among either rapists or 
heterosexual hebephiles.160  
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Others question the diagnosis of hebephilia as it may not be abnormal for men to 
be attracted to the adolescent age group in various cultures.161  Surveys of social 
organizations of persons acknowledging erotic interest in children, samples of sex 
offenders, and surveys from the general population have revealed that attraction to 
children of pubescent ages is more often reported than is the attraction to those of 
prepubescent ages.162  
These clinicians who opposed the hebephilia diagnosis say it will lack interrater 
reliability and validity as a diagnosis since it is not a formally recognized diagnosis 
in the DSM-IV-TR.  These examiners often will cite that the DSM-IV-TR provided a 
number of commonly known paraphilias such as coprophilia, urophilia, and 
zoophilia, but neglect other paraphilic conditions such as hebephilia, which is likely 
more prevalent amongst the general population and within sex offender populations 
than these other paraphilias.   
An area of heightened debate is whether pedophilia, hebephilia, and other 
paraphilia diagnoses for that matter can be in remission.163  This question occurs 
after an offender has been incarcerated for years and has not been exposed to a 
victim pool (children in prison) and therefore has not demonstrated symptoms of the 
disorder for years.  One can argue that the remoteness of the offending period and 
the offender’s current denial of emotional identification with children and sexual 
fantasies and masturbatory practices towards children, etc., indicates that his 
condition is in remission.  
Recently, Paraphilias Sub-workgroup is proposing changes to the diagnosis of 
pedophilia to be called pedohebephilic disorder in which the diagnosis includes 
hebephilic type (sexually attracted to pubescent children—generally ages eleven 
through fourteen).164 
Before the advent of new-age sexually violent predator civil commitment laws, 
the term hebephilia was not given much consideration by experts or the courts.  In 
fact it has been suggested that the term is proposed as a quintessential example of 
pretextuality in which special interests promote a pseudoscientific construct that 
advances an implicit instrumental goal (that of civil commitment by states).  To this 
date, there appears to be no clear professional consensus as to the clinical application 
of hebephilia.  
This author contends that adult sexual arousal in response to pubescent and post-
pubescent females is not likely to be pathologically deviant.165  As others have 
asserted, the DSM-IV-TR draws the distinction between pathological age-related 
sexual preferences, as adult sexual arousal to prepubescents is considered to be 
pathological and adult arousal to pubescents and postpubescents is considered to be 
nonpathological.  Put simply, hebephilia is not in the DSM-IV-TR currently as a 
listed paraphilia, and the paraphilia NOS category in the DSM-IV-TR does not 
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include evidence suggesting that it is intended to include hebephilia as a paraphilia.  
Since hebephilia is absent from the DSM-IV-TR, its reliability and validity as a 
diagnosis is negated.  Along these lines, sexual attraction to adolescent females or 
males, for that matter, is not a rare form of behavior. Scientific research, as outlined 
above, is imprecise in its attempt to pathologize sexual attraction to adolescents. 
G.  Volition and the DSM 
In conclusion, the assessment of volition is a legal decision.  A diagnosis of 
sexual deviance through a paraphilia by itself cannot be used to infer volitional 
impairment.  Further, the lack of interrater reliability and validity of various 
paraphilias listed in the DSM-IV-TR, and whether other paraphilias not even 
mentioned in the manual, can be formally used as diagnoses are at question in civil 
commitment proceedings.  Alternatively, the intensity, frequency, and severity of the 
sexual urges for example are essential to consider when assessing sex offending and 
volition. 
The expert must remember that diagnostic labels should not be considered 
dispositive of a legal issue.166  This is a useful premise to keep in mind because the 
reliability of diagnoses by clinicians is quite poor in SVP proceedings.  For example, 
the interrater reliability of eight DSM-IV diagnoses applied by experts to determine 
whether a client has a “mental abnormality that predisposes him to sexual violence” 
was found to be poor to fair in a study of civil commitment proceedings in Florida.167   
The expert witness must also be mindful of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) which states that the inclusion of 
diagnostic categories such as pedophilia does not imply that the conduct meets legal 
criteria for what constitutes mental disease and may not be wholly relevant to legal 
determinations.168  There is an imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate 
concern to the law and the information obtained in the clinical diagnosis.  The DSM 
includes, “[i]n determining whether an individual meets a specified legal standard . . 
. additional information is usually required beyond that contained in the DSM-IV 
diagnosis.  This might include information about the individual’s functional 
impairments and how these impairments affect the particular abilities in question.”169   
When applying diagnoses such as pedophilia to questions of volition, the DSM-
IV states, “even when diminished control over one’s behaviors is a feature of the 
disorder, having the diagnosis in itself does not demonstrate that a particular 
individual is (or was) unable to control his or her behavior at a particular time.”170  
Rather, the intensity, frequency, and severity of the deviant sexual drive leading to 
dysfunction are the issues in civil commitment proceedings.    
As mentioned previously, the law answers the question of what legal threshold is 
required to assess whether a sex offender lacks enough serious difficulty refraining 
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from sex offending behaviors in order to be committed.  However, the law is often 
guided by the science and vice versa, therefore, the expert witness may wish to 
consider the following elements (not in isolation) relevant to assessing an offender’s 
volitional impairment despite their lack of empirical support: 
 
1) Historically and currently meets criteria for a paraphilia diagnosis and 
preferably multiple paraphilias; 
 
2) Frequent acts of sexual violence within a closely proximate period of 
time when at risk in the community (while on supervision or while 
participating in  outpatient sex offender treatment programming); 
 
3) Offender sexually reoffends while he is participating in a sex offender 
treatment program; 
 
4) Offender engages in behavior when he is aware of a high probability of 
getting apprehended; 
 
5) Offender actively grooms a victim in the presence of an adult; 
 
6) Sexual offending while in prison or awaiting civil commitment 
hearings; 
 
7) Multiple victims; 
 
8) Offender lacks insight and understanding into his offending behavior; 
 
9) Offender lacks control of his behavior when it is unreasonable to expect 
him to engage or not engage in a certain act under his particular 
circumstances (considering context of offender’s offending patterns); 
 
10) Offender sexually acts out to relieve overwhelming anxiety and distress; 
 
11) Offender’s strength of sexual desire interferes with his ability to 
consider alternative courses of action and decision/ability not to offend; 
 
12) Offender consistently utilizes child pornography, including collecting 
great numbers of images, i.e., thousands to tens of thousands, 
categorizes them into various meaningful categories, and spends a 
significant amount of time viewing them on the computer, i.e., ten hours 
per day.  
 
When considering this vague and unoperational statutory language as to whether 
an offender has “serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child 
molestation if released,” courts will accept clinical testimony as long as it is derived 
and presented in good faith as to mental abnormality.171  
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H.  Recent AWA Case Law on Legal Mental Illness 
Since the implementation of the AWA, there have been relatively recent cases 
addressing psychiatric diagnoses in civil commitment proceedings, usually 
pertaining to whether a defendant meets the legal threshold of “serious difficulty in 
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.” 
One recent AWA sexually violent predator civil commitment case, United States 
v. Abregana, included the consideration of hebephilia as a mental disorder under the 
statute.172  The defendant Abregana exposed his genitals to a twelve year-old boy in 
a movie theater.  Abregana then sent sixteen diskettes containing child pornography 
to an undercover U.S. Postal Inspector.  The disks included 221 images of 
prepubescent, adolescent, and teenage boys engaged in sexually explicit conduct.  
Upon executing a search warrant at his residence, agents found five discs which 
contained child pornography including pictures of Abregana engaged in oral sex 
with a fifteen year-old boy.  Abregana was sentenced to prison and was subsequently 
released and violated supervision, and admitted to having sexual contact with a  
seventeen year-old minor during his supervision in which the boy touched 
Abregana’s penis through his clothing and on another occasion Abregana 
masturbated the minor’s penis.  Abregana was placed in custody and began a second 
term of supervised release.  He again violated supervision by viewing pornography 
and contacting three minors through email.  He had accessed photos of nude males, 
some sexually explicit, and he created a profile on an online chat-room claiming to 
be fourteen years of age.  He sent emails to male youth who were ten, twelve, and 
fourteen years of age.  Prior to his completion of his federal sentence, the Bureau of 
Prisons certification review panel certified him as a sexually dangerous person.173   
The federal court heard testimony from three sex offender psychologist 
experts.174  The government’s expert diagnosed Abregana with hebephilia under the 
paraphilia NOS diagnostic category due to his sexual arousal to post-pubescent 
adolescents, i.e., teenagers or minors having secondary sex characteristics.  The 
defense expert testified that Abregana had an attraction to adolescents but noted that 
hebephilia is not listed as a sexual deviance disorder in the DSM-IV-TR.175  The 
other defense expert agreed with the government’s diagnosis of hebephilia.176  This 
expert recognized the controversy over whether hebephilia is a valid diagnosis.  
While acknowledging that hebephilia is not included in the DSM-IV-TR, he agreed 
that there are authorities in the field who consider it a mental disorder and it has been 
part of the literature for a number of decades.177  However, the expert testified that 
the degree of pathology of hebephilia is much less than that of other paraphilias, 
such as pedophilia or sexual sadism.178  
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In its opinion, the federal trial court opined that the government had not proven 
that Abregana “suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a 
result of which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent 
conduct or child molestation if released.”179  The court found that Abregana suffered 
from a mental disorder, namely paraphilia NOS hebephilia, yet based on the expert 
evidence, hebephilia did not constitute a serious mental disorder.180  
In another recent federal civil commitment case, United States v. Shields,181 the 
court ruled that the government had not provided persuasive expert evidence that the 
offender has a mental illness, abnormality, or disorder named hebephilia.182  The 
court reasoned that while the peer-reviewed literature may establish that hebephilia 
is generally accepted in the field as a group identifier or label, it does not establish 
that hebephilia is generally accepted as a mental disorder by professionals who 
assess sexually violent offenders.183  The court recognized that both sides agreed that 
the attraction of an adult male to a pubescent adolescent is not, without more, 
indicative of a mental disorder.184  The court acknowledged the state experts’ 
opinions that hebephilia included abnormal behavior; however, it found that the 
government did not point to any peer-reviewed literature recognizing either experts’ 
diagnostic definition of a mental disorder called hebephilia.185  The court ruled, 
“[s]ignificantly, the American Psychiatric Association considered and rejected 
hebephilia as a diagnostic category for a mental disorder.  [] Moreover, there is no 
expert testimony in this record that psychiatric experts generally accept this 
definition of hebephilia as a mental disorder.”186 
Another federal district court case addressing psychiatric diagnosis and 
hebephilia in particular is United States v. Carta.187  In Carta, the federal 
government sought to commit Todd Carta.188  After pleading guilty to child 
pornographic charges in October 2002, Carta was sentenced to five years in federal 
prison and three years of supervised release.189  Carta began sex offender treatment 
within the Bureau of Prisons and withdrew in part due to his inability to curb his 
sexual interest in the program’s younger participants.190  During sex offender 
treatment, Carta described his sexual interest in children ages twelve to seventeen 
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 180 Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.  
 181 United States v. Shields, No. 07-12056-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13837 (D. Mass. 
Feb. 26, 2008). 
 182 Id.  
 183 Id.  
 184 Id.  
 185 Id.  
 186 Id. at *5.  
 187 United States v. Carta, 620 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D. Mass. 2009). 
 188 Id. at 212. 
 189 Id. at 214. 
 190 Id. at 215. 
39Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2012
346 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:307 
and secondary interest in children ages seven to eleven.191  He admitted to storing up 
to 20,000 images on his computer while spending up to fourteen hours per day 
looking at child pornography prior to his arrest.192  He admitted to sexually abusing 
minors on many occasions with his youngest victim being a child in diapers.  His 
primary victim age group by self-report was males between ages thirteen and 
twenty-eight.193  Prior to his release date, the Bureau of Prisons certified that Carta 
was a sexually dangerous person and began civil commitment proceedings.194  The 
government expert diagnosed Carta with paraphilia NOS that was characterized by 
hebephilia.195  The defense’s expert concluded that hebephilia was not a generally 
accepted diagnosis in the mental health community and did not fit within the DSM 
definition of paraphilia, lacked diagnostic criteria and could not be consistently 
defined, that normal adults may find adolescents arousing, and that articles offered 
by the government to support a hebephilia diagnosis were not legitimate peer-
reviewed research.196  
The district court found that the government had not proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that Carta was a sexually dangerous person and that hebephilia 
was not a “serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder” under the statute.197  The 
court acknowledged that hebephilia is not listed within the DSM category of 
paraphilia NOS and is not otherwise found within the DSM.198  The court considered 
whether classing hebephilia as a mental disorder was supported by research in the 
field of psychology and whether it was generally accepted in the psychiatric and 
psychological community, finding that there was some dispute in the field and it was 
not generally recognized as serious mental illness.199  
The court cited United States v. Shields and United States. v. Abregana in that the 
only federal courts to have addressed the diagnosis of hebephilia in sexually 
dangerous person cases have rejected it as a basis for commitment.200  The court 
questioned why the DSM editors would limit examples of paraphilia NOS to rare 
sexual fixations if the category was intended to include a sexual interest as common 
as attraction to post-pubescent adolescents.201  The court recognized that research has 
indicated that normal adult males experience sexual arousal to sexually developed 
adolescents and subsequently the definition of hebephilia could pathologize normal 
men.202  The court considered the difficulty in determining what age range qualifies 
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as adolescence given that the age of consent varies across jurisdictions as well as to 
the extent to which the difference in age between the adolescent and the adult affects 
the diagnosis.203  
Upon review of this district court’s decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision in Carta.204  To this date, this is 
the only federal court of appeals case dealing with hebephilia.  The appellate court 
criticized the district court’s approach in considering hebephilia as qualifying for the 
legal civil commitment criteria a “serious mental illness, abnormality, or 
disorder.”205  
The court believed Carta fell into the paraphilia diagnostic category in the 
DSM.206  Specifically, the Court cited the paraphilia NOS category as a catch-all 
category that lists various paraphilias.207  When applied to Carta, his past history of 
sexually abusing minors, his decades-long sexual fixation on minors causing him 
significant distress or impairment in his life, his in-prison behavior and expressed 
attitudes seemingly justify classifying him as suffering from a paraphilia.208  The 
court opined that it would be clear error to state that the DSM definition of paraphilia 
excluded an intense sexual fixation on young teenagers similar to Carta’s offending 
behaviors.209  While the district court did not want to stretch hebephilia into the 
paraphilia NOS category because it could pathologize normal men, the appellate 
court accepted hebephilia as a diagnosis simply pointing to adolescents as the target 
of Carta’s fixation.   
The court ruled that not everyone sexually attracted to adolescents is mentally 
disordered, rather, those offenders whose urges are so strong as to produce the 
symptoms and consequences identified in the DSM (similar to Carta), could be 
classified with a paraphilia NOS, that was characterized by hebephilia.210  Finally, 
the court suggested that the government’s position depended only on showing 
whether Carta’s sexual attraction to teenagers fell within the DSM definition of 
paraphilia NOS, not on showing that hebephilia is a mental disorder.211  The court 
remanded the case back to the district court to consider whether Carta is a sexually 
dangerous person.212    
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I.  Risk Assessment Instruments and Volition 
A question remains as to whether actuarial risk assessment instruments should be 
utilized in AWA commitment proceedings to provide for an assessment of “serious 
difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation.”213 
Actuarial risk assessment instruments identify predictive variables for a specific 
outcome that are each assigned weight.  The choice of data categories is driven by 
empirical research which demonstrates what groups of individuals, because of 
specific characteristics determining group membership, are at relatively higher risk.  
Actuarial assessments estimate the absolute likelihood or specific probability that an 
individual person will sexually/violently recidivate in the future on the basis of 
retrospective studies of groups of sex offenders released into the community.214  
Hence, group data define the individual one is evaluating.  
But as mentioned before, the expert evaluating an AWA commitment claim must 
realize there are different pathways to offending, and the sex offender specific 
actuarial risk assessment instruments tap into these constructs, based primarily on 
elements of sexual deviance and antisocial lifestyle.215  At this juncture, we have no 
empirical data linking the actuarial items to volitional impairments.  However, some 
experts, and certainly U.S. attorneys, may assume that high actuarial scores 
indicating high risk probability estimates are the best indicators of one’s serious 
difficulty refraining from sexual violence.  This is a major assumption and one that 
is not likely supported by empirical data.  Furthermore, the normative samples of the 
Static 99 for example, included exhibitionist type noncontact offenders but did not 
include online solicitation type offenders, common in federal court.216  Similarly, the 
Static 99 cannot be used to assess risk amongst sole child pornography possessors. 
There is a heightened standard of reliability and validity in risk assessment 
evidence given the consequences of loss of liberty and protection of the community 
from potential sexual violence.217  However, state courts handling sexually violent 
predator (SVP) cases have consistently admitted clinical judgment testimony 
                                                           
 213 As stated previously, the BOP has recommended the use of actuarial risk assessment 
instruments, Static-99 and RRASOR, to aid in assessing an offender’s serious difficulty in 
controlling his sex offending behaviors.  They recommend a risk assessment method of 
clinical adjustment to actuarial data.  Overriding factors to continue pursuit of commitment 
include Static-99 scores of six or greater and RRASOR scores of four or greater. 
 214 Howard, E. Barbaree, Calvin M. Langton & Edward J. Peacock, Different Actuarial 
Risk Measurements Produce Different Risk Rankings for Sexual Offenders, 18 SEX ABUSE: J. 
RES. & TREATMENT 423, 423 (2006); Anthony R. Beech, Dawn D. Fisher & David Thornton, 
Risk Assessment of Sex Offenders, 34 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 339, 340 (2003); Michael 
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 215 See Beech et al, supra note 214; see also Caton F. Roberts, Dennis M. Doren & David 
Thornton, Dimensions Associated with Assessments of Sex Offender Recidivism Risk, 29 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 569, 570 (2002). 
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establishing low levels of reliability in the courtroom.218  There is little doubt that the 
courts will allow actuarial testimony even when it is utilized to assess volitional 
impairment.  
The major questions state courts have considered regarding admissibility are the 
instruments’ reliability and accuracy as products of science and the importance of 
examiners and courts using them properly.  Courts such as the one in In re R.S.,219 
have upheld the reliability of actuarial risk assessment instruments as an aid in 
predicting recidivism.  However, they do not rely on them as litmus tests; rather, 
they are interpreted as one piece of a broader clinical evaluation.   
State appellate courts have considered the issues of evidentiary reliability of 
these instruments.  Two admitted actuarials220 and one denied their use,221 yet all 
three courts accepted clinical judgment.  The admissibility question surrounded not 
how accurate the instruments are to justify liberty infringements, but rather how 
accurate must they be to avoid potential prejudice arising from labeling actuarial 
prediction a science.222  One court established that scientific reliability was 
contextual and depended upon the complexity of the testimony and the likely impact 
of the testimony on the fact-finding process.223 
In People v. Taylor,224 the court rejected the use of actuarial instruments and 
questioned the youthfulness of the instruments and opined that the validity of the 
instruments has not been established.  Trial judges in Arizona and Missouri state 
commitment cases have held that the exclusion of actuarial risk testimony did not 
prevent the introduction of clinical judgment risk assessments.225 
In the case In re Valdez, a trial court in Florida granted an order to exclude 
actuarials as it opined that they may define sexual violence differently from the 
statute that is the basis of the legal proceedings.  They fail to address the causal 
nexus issue, they have potential for prejudice as they give a false impression that 
they provide an accurate and reliable estimate about the ultimate legal issue of risk 
assessment, they lack general acceptance, they lack probative value, and none of the 
tests included whether an offender has been treated or is on supervision, and the 
court stressed the instrument’s sole reliance on static factors.226    
Federal district courts have allowed the use of actuarial risk assessment 
instruments in federal sex offender cases, including AWA civil commitment cases.227  
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In United States v. Shields,228 the U.S. District Court ruled that actuarial risk 
assessments (RRASOR, STATIC-99) and any adjusted actuarial approach, including 
the “guided clinical method” and the “adjusted actuarial method,” are reliable under 
the standards set forth in Daubert.229  The court reasoned that these assessments are 
generally accepted as a reliable methodology within the relevant scientific 
community and they have been subject to peer review.  Further, the court found that 
experts in at least nineteen other states rely upon actuarial risk assessment in forming 
their opinions on sex offenders’ risk of recidivism and only Illinois was found to rule 
that some expert testimony based upon actuarial risk assessment was deemed 
inadmissible on the question of sexual recidivism.230 
Overall, the instruments must be evaluated for “fit” (their association to the 
pertinent legal inquiry), and the prejudicial impact of actuarial risk assessment 
instruments might be the most significant issue challenging their reliability.  The 
legal inquiry in AWA cases addresses the issue of “serious difficulty refraining,” and 
federal courts must consider whether the instruments’ foundations and objectives 
satisfy the legal fit issue for admissibility.  One can consider that a high score 
indicates that an offender is high risk and therefore he has serious difficulty 
refraining, yet the actuarial instruments may appear to be a better fit with the 
ambiguous term “likely” than the AWA volitional language.   
Actuarial instruments will likely continue to be admitted into state and federal 
courts due to their proclaimed accuracy and utility as they tout interrater reliability, 
measurement error, predictive validity with future sexual violence, and have been 
tested and published in peer review literature.231  Judges will continue to perceive 
that they are probative to legal questions and will consider them as support to 
experts’ clinical opinions.  Additionally, the Bureau of Prisons also recommends that 
psychologists practicing within the BOP who are performing AWA commitment 
assessments, utilize risk assessment tools that are relied upon by professionals in the 
field.232 
Most experts who are asked to assess for future sexual violence utilize these 
instruments in their risk assessments.  However, experts, attorneys, and judges in 
these cases must be aware of the strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of the 
instruments.  They must challenge their use when applying them to the statutory 
language “serious difficulty refraining” in AWA cases.  
 We turn now to the dispositive answer to our volitional questions, namely how 
the courts assess and interpret one’s volitional impairments as they relate to sex 
offending behaviors.  
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J.  Distinguishing State and Federal Sex Offenders: Profiles of State Civilly 
Committed Sex Offenders 
One may ask what is the difference between the atypical sex offender appropriate 
for indefinite civil commitment versus the dangerous but typical recidivist 
considered in the holdings of Hendricks and Crane?  A few states offer some 
analysis of the demographic and clinical profiles of their committed offenders.  In 
Florida, researchers found that offenders who were of a nonminority race, carried 
diagnoses and/or assessments of pedophilia and paraphilia NOS, had significant 
evidence of psychopathy, had high actuarial risk assessment scores, offended against 
a younger age victim, and had more total victims and offended against victims of 
both genders were more likely to be civilly committed under the state’s Jimmy Ryce 
Act.233  
Another study in Arizona assessed commonalities amongst civilly committed sex 
offenders in Arizona and found that they averaged 2.6 sex offense convictions and 
85% had prior nonsexual offenses.234  Most of the offenders abused children 
sexually, some abused both children and adults, and a small number of offenders 
sexually offended against adults.  About 90% of the Arizona sample had a history of 
alcohol abuse, 68% marijuana abuse, and 42% cocaine abuse.  About 63% had a 
diagnosis of pedophilia, 56% paraphilia not otherwise specified, 14% exhibitionism, 
13% voyeurism, and 40% antisocial personality disorder.235  
A study examining Minnesota’s civil commitment detainees revealed that about 
5% of all sex offenders released from the state’s prisons eventually were civilly 
committed.236  About 46% of the detainees had four or more previous felony 
convictions, 77% had two or more previous sex crimes, and 27% had four or more 
previous sex crimes.237  About 37% of the detainees victimized adults, 37% 
victimized children, and 25% victimized children aged ten to seventeen.238  About 
51% of the detainees victimized acquaintances and only 13% were relatives of their 
victims, while 7% had stranger victims.239  About 70% of the detainees offended 
against females, 20% against males, and 10% had victims of both sexes.240  Most 
often the detainees carried substance abuse diagnoses (52%), followed by Pedophilia 
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(35%), and APD (26%).241  The authors of this study found that their civil detainees 
were highly variable and heterogeneous in nature.242 
K.  Understanding the Federal Sex Offender  
As of February 2007, the Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) Central Office Review Panel 
had reviewed 2,386 inmates for potential 18 U.S.C. § 4248 civil commitment, and 
only 22 inmates have been certified as sexually dangerous persons and were pending 
civil commitment hearings.243 
To date, the BOP has filed certificates on prisoners to be considered for civil 
commitment who have diagnoses with pedophilia, paraphilia, antisocial personality 
disorder, or a combination of those three diagnoses.244  Many have had sexual 
paraphilia diagnoses including exhibitionism, voyeurism, fetishism, sexual sadism, 
and frotterism, while others have had nonsexual disorder diagnoses including bipolar 
disorder, borderline, depressive, or histrionic personality disorders.245   
Many federal sex offenders differ from state sex offenders as they have 
committed federal specific sex crimes.  These federal sex offenses often are 
noncontact sex offenses such as Internet solicitation and possession of child 
pornography.  Some federal sex offenders being considered for civil commitment 
under the AWA will also have a history of state sex offense crimes prior to their 
incarceration within the BOP. 
Imperative to the language of the AWA, is the fact that any sex offender within 
the BOP can be petitioned for commitment.  For example, consider a one-time sex 
offender who attempted to solicit a federal agent for sex believing she was thirteen 
years-old; this can be defined as “attempting to engage in sexually violent conduct or 
child molestation” and be deemed sexually dangerous to others and be subject to 
commitment proceedings.  However, this offender would not likely be considered as 
having a serious difficulty in refraining from acts of sexual violence.  In contrast, a 
pornography possessor who has no hands-on sexual offenses, and who may have 
attempted to solicit another with intent of a contact sex offense, could potentially be 
committed indefinitely without ever physically assaulting anyone.  
When considering the assessment of federal sex offenders, questions arise 
including what are the risks of reoffending for pornography and solicitation 
offenders. Does pornography possession lead to future contact and noncontact sex 
offenses? Are pornography possession sex offenders pedophilic and present as high 
risk sex offenders?  Is there a difference between solicitors who have interacted with 
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real victims versus those whose offenses were against undercover law enforcement 
officers?   
L.  Online Solicitation 
Many federal sex crimes are noncontact and “hands-off” in nature.  They often 
include solicitation and pornography possession cases.  These offenders are still 
vulnerable to AWA commitment proceedings.  The former crime includes the trendy 
“catch a predator” cases in which an individual will solicit an underage person 
through online Internet contact and attempt to meet the underage person at a certain 
destination, only to find undercover police or federal law enforcement there to arrest 
him.  These online solicitation cases are policed by county or federal law 
enforcement agency sting-type operations.  
Each year, one in five youth encounter online solicitations via chat-rooms or 
instant messaging routes that are sexual in nature.  The National Juvenile Online 
Victimization Survey has studied law enforcement investigations of Internet sex 
crimes against minors.  They have found that 25% of all arrests for Internet sex 
crimes against minors were due to “proactive” investigations where police/federal 
agents pose online as minors or pretend to be mothers teaching their children about 
sex.246  These investigations allow law enforcement to catch suspects before they 
have an opportunity to offend.  Undercover investigations can be referred to as 
“reactive” or “take over” when police learn of a solicitation to a real child victim and 
then they pose as the original minor and target the suspect.   
In the year 2000, one quarter (644) of the Internet sex crimes against juveniles 
(about 2, 500 total arrests) were based on proactive investigation.  Other arrests were 
for crimes committed by the offenders who met the juveniles online (20%), other sex 
crimes committed against juveniles by family members or acquaintances against 
juvenile victims (19%), and the possession, distribution, or trading of pornography 
on the Internet (36% of arrests).247 
Because proactive and many reactive solicitation cases include no contact sex 
offenses, these offenders’ characteristics and sexual dangerousness is questioned.  
Offenders who attempted to target online (law enforcement) victims have a tendency 
to be lower risk than those who targeted actual juvenile victims.  Those who target 
actual juvenile victims were more likely to have more prior arrests for non-sexual 
offenses and for sexual offenses against minors, have a lower income, and were less 
likely to be employed full-time at the time of the offense.  Both groups had similarly 
high rates of child pornography possession and drug and alcohol use patterns.248 
Research has indicated that among sex offenders with Internet sex crimes 
(solicitation with identified victims, solicitations with law enforcement, and 
possessors of child pornography), about two-thirds have possessed child 
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pornography, about 10% have prior arrests for sex offenses against minors, and 11% 
had been known to be violent to any degree.249    
M.  Illegal Pornography Possessors 
Many federal sex offenders have only child pornography possession and/or 
distribution type cases in their sex offending history.  Others will have contact sex 
offenses in addition to their pornography type cases.  In some cases, a sex offender 
will have a history of possession of pornography and will entice a live victim to 
engage in the production of pornographic material.   
Researchers also suggest that Internet offenders may fall into three categories: 
collecting pornography as part of a larger pattern of sexual offending; collecting to 
feed a developing sexual interest in children; and accessing indecent images of 
children out of curiosity.250  Importantly, the expert evaluating offenders with illegal 
possession of child pornography must be able to distinguish higher risk offenders 
with an affinity for child pornography and a significant deviant sexual drive towards 
children versus the offender who “got caught up” in online trade and possession of 
child pornography which was fueled in part by curiosity, social isolation, and need 
for power.251 
There is scant research on the criminal histories and later offending of child 
pornography offenders.  At least one study has indicated that offenders who accessed 
child pornography often had no prior criminal background.252  Research data reveals 
that child pornography offenders with prior criminal records were significantly more 
likely to offend in various ways (general, violent, and sexual offenses).253  About a 
quarter of the sample of pornography offenders had prior contact sex offenses and 
15% had prior child pornography offenses.254  After an average time at risk of 29.7 
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months, 17% of the sample had reoffended.255  Only 9% of the contact sex offenders 
committed a further contact sexual offense and 5% committed a further pornography 
offense.256  In contrast, about 1% of the child pornography-only offenders escalated 
to committing a contact sexual reoffense and 4% committed a further pornography 
offense.257  Those child pornography offenders who had committed a prior or 
concurrent contact sex offense were the most likely to offend again, either generally 
or sexually.  As expected, a history of contact sex offenses is predictive of future 
hands-on sex offenses even with pornography type offenders.   
Contemporary research by Wolak, Finkelhor, and Mitchell258 examined child 
pornography possessors and trends in offender characteristics and found that only 
9% had a prior arrest for a sex offense against a minor, 5% had been registered as a 
sex offender at the time of the crime.  About 45% of these offenders were dual 
offenders charged with both child pornography and concurrent child sexual abuse.  
One recent article examined the characteristics of Internet child pornography 
offenders versus child molesters.259  The former group was significantly younger, 
possessed lower psychopathic traits, had more psychological difficulties in 
adulthood, and fewer prior sexual convictions than the child molester group.260  
However, in one recent study, researchers found that child pornography offenses are 
a valid diagnostic indicator of the diagnosis of pedophilia.261  In fact, offenders 
charged with child pornography offenses were more sexually aroused 
phallometrically towards children than were child molesters who had offended 
against child victims.262  Whether this indicates that this group is more likely to 
hands-on sexually reoffend is unclear.263 
The characteristics of online sex offenders have been recently explored.264  The 
researchers found that when comparing online to offline offenders, the former group 
had more victim empathy and greater sexual deviancy, while both groups reported 
significantly greater rates of childhood physical and sexual abuse than the general 
population.  
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In a meta-analytic study, the authors found that 12% of online sexual offenders 
(particularly child pornography offenders) had an officially known contact sexual 
offense history at the time of their index offense.265  Another meta-analysis revealed 
that 4.6% of online offenders committed a new sexual offense of some kind during a 
1.5 to 6-year follow-up period (2% committed a contact sexual offense and 3.4% 
committed a new child pornography offense).266  
Another recent study analyzed a group of offenders who were subsequently 
charged with consumption of illegal pornographic material over a six year follow-up 
period.267  The researchers found that 3% of the sample recidivated with a violent 
and/or sex offense or with a hands-off sex offense (0.8%).268  They concluded that 
consuming child pornography alone is not a risk factor for committing hands-on sex 
offenses.269 
N.  Does Use of Pornography Escalate to Contact Sex Offending? 
One critical issue to address in AWA civil commitment cases is the link between 
child pornography possession and contact sex offenses.  The AWA does not require 
a hands-on offense and an offender can even be civilly committed due to one 
possession or solicitation case.  However, federal prosecutors may be prudent to 
elect to petition for commitment of higher risk sex offenders with multiple sex 
crimes and victims in their history as these offenders may have volitional 
impairments.270   
There are possible associations between pornography use and the sexual abuse of 
children: 
1) Child pornography use is an expression of existing sexual interests; 
 
2) Child pornography is used to prime the individual to offend and 
disinhibits deviant sexual behavior; 
 
3) Child pornography has a corrosive effect (prolonged use of child 
pornography includes increased use, increased attraction to images and 
desensitized views of harm to victims); 
 
4) Child pornography has a cathartic effect (viewing pornography is the 
sole outlet for an individual’s attraction to children); 
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5) Child pornography is a by-product of pedophilia and it reinforces 
pedophilic arousal patterns; 
 
6) Child pornography use dehumanizes children and encourages adult and 
child sexuality; 
 
7) Child pornography is utilized by certain offenders as a grooming tool. 
 
Pornography use can escalate to the commission of hands-on contact offenses 
through the processes of downloading and collecting of images, viewing of images, 
distributing of images, and the fantasy and masturbation towards the images.271  
Viewing of non-violent and violent pornography may increase aggression and rape-
myth acceptance.272   
Yet many studies do not reveal a causal link between use of pornography and 
contact sex offenses.273  For example, a recent study in Switzerland analyzed the 
association between the consumption of child pornography and subsequent hands-on 
sex offenses in a sample of child pornography users and found low rates of hands-on 
offending over a six year period.274  The authors studied 231 male offenders who 
were charged with consumption of illegal pornographic material after being detected 
by a special operation against Internet child pornography conducted by the Swiss 
Police in 2002.  The authors found that 4.8% of the sample of offenders had a prior 
conviction for a sexual and/or violent offense and 1% for a hands-on sex offense 
involving child sexual abuse, 3.3% for a hands-off sex offense and one for a 
nonsexual violent offense.  The authors found that only 3% of the study sample 
recidivated with a violent and/or sexual offense, 3.9% recidivated with a hands-off 
sexual offense, and 0.8% recidivated with a hands-on sex offense over a six year 
follow-up period.  The authors concluded that consuming child pornography alone is 
not a risk factor for committing hands-on sex offenses and the prognosis for hands-
on sex offenses as well as for child pornography recidivism is favorable.275  These 
results are similar to previously mentioned meta-analysis276 finding that 2.0% of 
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online offenders committed a future hands-on sex offense over a 1.5 to 6 year 
follow-up period.  Another study examined the association between child 
pornography consumption and the subsequent perpetration of hands-on sex 
offenses.277  In their sample of convicted child pornography consumers (24% who 
had been also convicted for a hands-on sex offense against a minor), Seto and Eke 
found a recidivism rate of 1.3% for hands-on sex offenses and 5.3% for hands-off 
sex offenses in a follow-up time of two and a half years.278 
Other data appear inconclusive as Howitt investigated convicted hands-on sex 
offenders who reported that the source of sexual stimuli did not stem solely from 
child pornography material, but from the cognitive manipulation of legal adult 
pornography or from seeing arousing images in newspapers and magazines usually 
not involving nudity.279  The author concluded that it is not possible to establish an 
association between hands-on sex offenses and the consumption of illegal child 
pornography.   
Some child molesters commit a contact sex offense against a child in order to 
have proximity with the child to produce pornographic material with the goal of 
viewing and/or distributing.  Viewing child pornography and masturbating towards 
images may be a substitute for a hands-on sex offense against a child.  In fact, one 
author studied men who were attracted to male child pornography and found that 
they self-reported that viewing child pornography was a substitute for hands-on 
offending and it did not lead to an increase in seeking out boys to satisfy sexual 
needs.280   
Conversely, other research has revealed that offenders who view child 
pornography exhibit greater sexual arousal to children than adults and differed from 
a group of sex offenders who had contact-offense child victims.281  Small groups of 
sex offenders, perhaps about 10%, have admitted using pornography as an element 
to the preparation of a hands-on sex offense or as part of the sex offense itself.282  
Most likely, those sex offenders with many risk factors to reoffend may be more 
vulnerable in utilizing pornography as a catalyst to their hands-on offending patterns.  
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However, Marshall found that 53% of his sample of child molesters deliberately 
used pornographic stimuli as part of their planned preparation for offending.283  
Kingston and colleagues examined convicted hands-on sex offenders and found 
that the consumption of illegal pornography was a relevant risk factor and that 
offenders who had consumed illegal pornography were more likely to reoffend 
irrespective of their risk level of recidivism.284  
Additionally, a recent study indicated that 17% of sex offenders (incest 
offenders, offenders against children, offenders against adults, and exhibitionists) 
utilized pornography in their sex offenses, and of the users, 13% used pornography 
to stimulate themselves to commit a hands-on sex crime, 55% showed pornographic 
material to their victims, and 36% took pictures, mostly of child victims.285  About 
25% of the extrafamilial offenders against boys and 29% of the incest offenders 
against girls utilized pornography during the commissions of their crimes.286 
The National District Attorney’s Association (NDAA) published a paper in 2004 
citing recent studies suggesting that there is a significant link between viewing child 
pornography and molesting children.287  According to the U.S. Postal Inspection 
Service, at least 80% of purchasers of child pornography are active hands-on 
offenders of children and about 40% of the child pornographers who were 
investigated in a several year period had sexually abused children.288  From January 
of 1997 through March of 2004, 1,807 child pornographers were arrested and 620 of 
them were confined child molesters.289  About 35% of these child pornographers 
were actual child molesters defined as an offender who had confessed to acts of child 
molesting or who had a record for molestation, or who were involved in an overt act 
in order to procure children for sexual purposes.  The 620 confirmed child molesters 
led to 839 child victims who were identified and rescued.290 
The NDAA cites other studies suggesting a link between child pornography and 
hands-on sex offending.  Reports by state-based Internet Crimes Against Children 
(ICAC) task forces confirm a positive connection between the possession of child 
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pornography and the commission of crimes against children.291  In fact, the 
Pennsylvania ICAC task force found that 51% of offenders arrested for pornography 
related offenses were last determined to be actively molesting children or to have 
molested them in the past.292  In Dallas, the ICAC task force found that 32% of the 
offenders arrested over the course of one year for child pornography offenses were 
also molesting children or had molested them in the past.293 
In another study of thirteen men convicted of downloading child pornography off 
the Internet, Quayle and Taylor found that there was a relationship between use of 
child pornography and achieving sexual arousal.294  They also found that some of the 
offenses used the child pornography as collectibles in that pleasure was obtained 
from collecting pictures a part of a series.295 
When considering child molester and rapist groups, both have similar rates of 
exposure to pornography in the home or during their developmental years.  
However, child molesters are more likely than rapists to utilize pornography in 
adulthood and use materials prior to and during their offenses.296  Those child 
molesters, who had been sexually assaulted during childhood and when the 
perpetrator used pornographic materials, were more likely to have followed similar 
behavior patterns during their sex offenses as perpetrators.  Child molesters are more 
likely to utilize pornography to relieve the impulse to commit a sex offense than are 
rapists.297   
Unpublished and published data have indicated that about one third of men who 
use child pornography have previously committed sexual offenses against 
children.298  
The National Juvenile Online Victimization Study data has revealed that 40% of 
the cases involving child pornography possession included “dual offenders” who not 
only possessed illegal pornography but victimized a child in the same 
investigation.299  While 27% of dual offenders showed or gave child pornography to 
children in a grooming type fashion, 9% of the dual offenders sent child 
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pornography to undercover officers posing as juveniles.300  Interestingly, 25% of the 
dual offenders admitted to grooming (interest a victim in or overcome inhibitions 
about sexual activity).301  Further data reveal that child pornography offenders who 
organized their collections or who distributed pornography differed from other 
offenders in being more likely to have 1,000 more images of child pornography and 
images of children under age six.302  However, no studies have supported the effect 
of child pornography use and hands-on offending even with this more deviant 
group.303   
When considering this information, it is speculative to assume that possession of 
pornography is a causative factor to hands-on offending.  A mental health 
professional examining such a case should look at patterns of sex offending 
behavior, view the images himself to understand what stimulates the sex offender, 
and distinguish the period of time the offender possessed and viewed the images.    
Despite these efforts, the federal prosecutor may continue to push commitment 
proceedings on sex offenders who have multiple pornography type crimes believing 
that noncontact sex offenders too can have serious difficulty refraining from their 
illegal sex acts.  Additionally, they may wish to target sex offenders who possess 
“hardcore” abusive type pornography due to its heinousness and marked deviance.  
Whether an expert can reliably provide a risk assessment for future contact and 
noncontact sex offenses relevant to an offender with only child pornography 
possession in his record has yet to be seen.  Furthermore, whether actuarial risk 
assessment instruments which are geared to assessing future hands-on sex crimes can 
be adequately used with pornography possession offenders is unclear.   
O.  Undetected Sex Offenses 
Another topic that will likely flood AWA commitment hearings is the question of 
undetected sex offenses among sex offender groups.  This matter is relevant due to 
research data that arose from the BOP Butner sex offender treatment facility 
implying that many of the pornography type sex offenders admitted to numerous 
hands-on type sex offenses during their disclosures in treatment.304   
Dr. Hernandez, Director of the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) at 
Federal Correctional Institution-Butner, has presented data regarding 155 sexual 
offenders in a voluntary intensive residential sex offender-specific treatment 
program at a medium-security federal prison.  At the time of sentencing, 115 (74%) 
of the offenders had no documented hands-on victims.  Twenty-six percent had 
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known histories of abusing a child via a hands-on sexual act.  The number of victims 
known at the time of sentencing was 75 (an average of 1.88 victims) per offender.305   
By the end of the eighteen month residential treatment program, 24 (15%) of the 
subjects denied they committed hands-on sexual abuse and 131 (85%) admitted they 
committed at least one hands-on sexual offense indicating a 59% increase in the 
number of subjects with known hands-on offenses.306  The number of reported 
victims known at the end of treatment among all offenders was 1,777, an average of 
13.56 victims per offender307 and an increase of 2,369% in the number of hands-on 
sexual contact offenses acknowledged.308  The 40 subjects who had known histories 
of hands-on offending at the time of sentencing disclosed an average of 19.4 victims 
during their treatment period, while the 115 subjects with no known histories of 
hands-on sex offenses disclosed an average of 8.7 victims.309  Further, the authors 
found that the majority of participants reported that they committed acts of hands-on 
abuse prior to seeking child pornography on the Internet and consequently, the 
Internet is a causal factor in contact sex offenses.310  Specifically, the authors argue 
that the results of their study suggest that many Internet child pornography offenders 
may be undetected child molesters and their use of child pornography demonstrates 
their paraphilic orientation.311  
In defense of their study, the authors site that despite the motivations of the 
offenders to volunteer for the treatment program, most of the offenders were not 
parole eligible and therefore their participation would not affect their release date.  
Additionally, the authors found that polygraph studies among half of the offender 
group did not indicate over-reporting with any subject.312   
The authors found that a significant number of Internet sex offenders in their 
sample admitted to committing hands-on sexual abuse, which in part was facilitated 
by their participating in the treatment program.313  The authors surmise that few if 
any offenders would have admitted to the initially undisclosed hands-on offenses if it 
were not for the treatment program.314  Further, the authors contend that the study 
supports the belief that child pornography offenders are involved in more than 
collecting pictures, but many are committing hands-on assaults.315  Finally, the 
authors conclude that child pornography for some offenders reinforces pedophilic 
arousal patterns, desensitizes them to the harm inflicted to the victims, normalizes 
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child/adult sexual relations, dehumanizes children, and disinhibits deviant sexual 
behavior.316 
In another study, Hernandez studied ninety inmates who had been treated 
through the same sex offender treatment program.317  Specifically, Hernandez 
summarized that sixty-two of the ninety offenders were convicted of Internet-related 
sexual offenses such as possession and distribution of pornography as well as 
interstate travel with the intent to meet a child (solicitation).  At the time of 
sentencing, those sixty-two offenders were known to have committed contact sexual 
offenses against a total of fifty-five victims.  Following the treatment, the same 
group reported committing contact sex offenses against an additional 1,379 victims.  
About 42% of the offenders were known contact sexual offenders at the time of 
sentencing, yet 76% reported contact sexual crimes.318  Importantly, Hernandez’s 
studies have been questioned due to their statistical underpinnings and potential 
manipulation of inmates in treatment to report sex crimes.  
Underscoring this issue of undetected sex crimes, data from the National Crime 
Victimization Survey reported 260,300 incidents of attempted or completed rapes; 
however, those crimes actually reported to police were 97,460, suggesting that only 
37% of the sexual crimes were reported to law enforcement.319  Only about half of all 
reported rapes were cleared by arrest and only about 19% of the rapes and attempted 
rapes reported to the National Crime Victims Survey were cleared by arrest.320  Data 
suggests that the observed rates including arrests and reports to law enforcement 
highly underestimate the actual rates of sexual offending.  This data can be used by 
the government to suggest that sex offenders, in general, commit more offenses on 
average than might be suspected.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
The Adam Walsh Act provides the most punitive and far reaching sex offender 
legislation in this country’s history.  This Article has focused on one element of this 
law, namely the civil commitment of federal sex offenders.   
While the federal government appears to be exercising its police powers, it also 
enacted the commitment scheme while preserving U.S. Supreme Court landmark 
holdings in Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane.  Many state commitment laws 
focus on the assessment of an offender’s mental abnormality and/or personality 
disorder and a finding of likelihood of future offending.  Many jurisdictions ignore 
the holding in Crane, and some judges will not allow the expert to comment on the 
volitional requirement, nor do they mandate the communication of this condition to 
the trier of fact.  Simply, trial court judges adhere to legislative statutory language 
without considering U.S. Supreme Court case law.  Positively, the AWA civil 
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Treatment Program Federal Correctional Institution, Butner, N.C.). 
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commitment format follows the volitional spirit articulated in Crane and experts 
should testify to this volitional issue.   
Similar to state commitment proceedings and pursuant to the decision in 
Hendricks, the forensic evaluators must assess, and the courts must determine,  
which federal sex offenders are atypical and subject to commitment, versus which 
ones are typical recidivists who have served their criminal sentences and need to be 
released.  Proving whether a person has a volitional impairment—”serious difficulty 
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released”—should be 
a very difficult issue to prove as most criminal and sexual offenders exercise 
significant control over their behaviors.  Experts should never solely equate 
psychiatric diagnoses or scores from actuarial instruments with volitional 
impairments, nor should they confuse the term “likely” with inability to 
“refrain/control.”  Accordingly, there is no scientific basis for distinguishing whether 
an act is a function of freewill or an irresistible type impulse.321  Rather, one’s 
serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct is a moral question to 
ultimately be decided by the trier of fact with aid from the expert witness.   
This point outlines a main theme in the Crane holding that distinguishes typical 
recidivists from those repeat sex offenders who simply cannot control their 
behaviors.  The Crane decision assumes that those offenders being considered for 
commitment have more than one prior sex offense conviction, and that one time sex 
offenders are not appropriate for commitment.  
The U.S. Supreme Court in Crane essentially differentiated a typical sex offender 
from one who should be civilly committed by incorporating an abstract “freewill” 
doctrine.  It is easy for an expert witness to simply say an offender lacks control over 
his behaviors, yet, they need to utilize an assessment process that attempts to dissect 
this offender’s offending patterns to satisfactorily answer the question.  Pursuant to 
the objectives of the AWA commitment act, the expert must specify his sex offender 
risk assessment to the federal sex offender, one who often has a history of child 
pornography and/or solicitation type cases.  
The fields of psychology and psychiatry readily admit they have serious 
difficulties in answering this volitional impairment question.  Additionally, 
numerous typical recidivists display multiple sex offenses and deviant sexual 
interests.  Many experts and juries assume that because an offender has a criminal 
record of more than one sex offense, that the offender did not and does not have 
control over his behavior.  This hypothesis is flawed and simply not true in many 
cases.  The challenge in AWA civil commitment of sex offender cases is for the 
expert to attempt to accurately differentiate the typical recidivist who chooses to 
commit crimes and is willfully dangerous and unwilling to restrain himself, versus 
the recidivist who cannot control his behaviors and who suffers from volitional 
impairments. 
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